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1ABSTRACT: 
 
Law is contributing to an information security paradox.  Consumers are regularly 
“consenting” to the installation of computer code that makes them more vulnerable to 
harms such as identity theft.  In particular, digital rights management technology 
accompanying digital music has recently left a wake of compromised user machines.   
Using the case study of security-invasive digital rights management technology, this 
article argues that a fundamental tension exists among intellectual property law, computer 
intrusion law and contract law regarding meaningful consumer consent in digital 
contexts.   This article proposes to ease the noise in consent doctrine through creating an 
objective “reasonable digital consumer” standard based on empirical testing of real 
consumers.   In a manner similar to the way in which courts empirically assess actual 
consumer confusion in trademark law, the primary vehicle of digital consent, digital user 
agreements, can be tested for legal usability.  Specifically, a particular digital agreement 
would be deemed to withstand an unconscionability challenge only to the extent that a 
drafter can demonstrate that a “reasonable digital consumer” is capable of meaningfully 
understanding its terms and presentation.  The proposed empirical reasonable digital 
consumer standard strikes a successful balance between customization and 
standardization by using the real understandings of users; it also allows for evolution of 
these understandings over time, as users’ familiarity with technology and technology 
itself advances. 
 
Technoconsen(t)sus 
 
Andrea M. Matwyshyn1
Popping your favorite band’s new disc in a work computer can result in security 
compromise of your employer’s computer network. Playing this disc in your home 
computer can result in your identity being stolen using financial data stored on your 
machine’s hard drive, and your machine can become a remotely-controlled spam 
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2zombie.2 Consumers worry about identity theft and express growing concern over 
information security,3 yet consumers appear to be regularly “consenting” to serious 
security risks when they use everyday products with digital rights management 
technologies or DRM.      This contradiction in consumer behavior poses a critical 
question for the law:  is there a set of legal problems that contribute to this information 
security consent paradox?   The answer is a resounding yes.  
In the name of defending intellectual property, DRM now frequently engages in 
behaviors that, on their face, appear identical to hacking behaviors.  In particular, digital 
music is being protected by the recording industry through security-invasive DRM that 
hides from users, cannot be easily uninstalled, compromises security of user machines, 
stealthily reports on user behaviors and permanently disables certain functions on the 
computers of users.4 The determination of whether these DRM risks are known to 
consumers and legally acceptable, as well as whether the DRM behaviors constitute 
hacking or permissible intellectual protection turns solely on the question of whether a 
user consents.    Therefore, digital “consent” now pushes together at least three bodies of 
 
2 Zombie drones are security compromised machines that can be controlled remotely without the user’s 
knowledge for sending spam or other malicious purposes.  See, e.g., Lilian Edwards, Dawn of the Death of 
Distributed Denial of Service: How to Kill Zombies, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 23 (2006); Primer: 
zombie drone, WASHINGTON POST, February 1, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A304-2004Jan31.html (last visited January 28, 2004); Testimony of Thomas M. Dailey, Chair 
and President U.S. Internet Service Providers Association, General Counsel, Verizon Online, Before the 
Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the Census, June 16, 
2004,  http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Dailey%20Testimony1.pdf (last visited March 1, 2005).  
Purchasing spam time on a zombie drone is also relatively inexpensive, costing as little as 3-10 cents per 
host machine per week. See, e.g., For rent: Hacked zombie PCs for Net mischief,  
http://newpaper.asia1.com.sg/top/story/0,4136,67698-1093276740,00.html?. See also Sunbreaks, A New 
Species: Stefan Savage’s Talk at NDSS, February 4, 2005,  http://sunbreaks.blogspot.com/ .
3 See, e.g. Juan Carlos Perez, Security concerns to stunt e-commerce growth, June 24, 2005,  
http://www.infoworld.com/article/05/06/24/HNsecurityconcerns_1.html
4 See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, Real Story of the Rogue Rootkit, WIRED, Nov. 17, 2005 
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,69601,00.html . US-CERT, part of the US Department of 
Homeland Security advised consumers not to install software from an audio CD. See US-CERT  
http://www.us-cert.gov/current/current_activity.html#xcpdrm (last visited May 2, 2006). 
3law:  intellectual property law, computer intrusion law, and contract law.    The resulting 
“noise” from this accidental merger must be quickly addressed; this noise is a harbinger 
of imminent large-scale security compromise of networks in the name of intellectual 
property protection. 5 In social systems, finding this type of legal noise triggers a need 
for review: sometimes, we need to prod our system a little toward developing into a more 
socially optimal regime.6 Security-invasive DRM has revealed the need to doctrinally 
nudge “consent.”  
 
This article proposes to ease doctrinal noise in consent through creating an 
objective “reasonable digital consumer” standard based on empirical testing of real 
consumers.   In a manner similar to the way in which courts assess actual consumer 
confusion in trademark law, digital user agreements can be tested for legal usability.  
Specifically, a particular digital agreement would be deemed to withstand an 
unconscionability challenge only to the extent that a drafter can demonstrate that a 
“reasonable digital consumer” is capable of meaningfully understanding its terms and 
presentation.   
This proposal of an empirically generated reasonable digital consumer standard 
harnesses the dynamics of three separate types of code - computer code,7 legal code,8 and  
 
5 Despite the urgency of the current information security situation, noise is not inherently bad.  In 
fact, a small amount of noise in a system can result in more optimal functionality in the long term.  See, 
e.g., P.L. Mazzeo, M. Nitti, E. Stella, and A. Distante, Visual Recognition of Noisy Fastening Bolts using 
Neural Networks and Wavelet Transform, http://www.actapress.com/PaperInfo.aspx?PaperID=18813.
6 Noise in law is a signal to examine doctrinal emergence and, perhaps, to modify our legal 
constructs in a more adaptive manner. 
7 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE, 53 (1999). 
8 Id. 
4organizational code.9 As Larry Lessig has articulated, computer code can act as a 
powerful form of regulation, transmitting the values of its creators, and legal code then 
comments on computer code to exert a second regulatory force.  Lessig’s framework can 
be expanded to include a third type of regulation, organizational code that arises from 
dynamic interactions:  regulation emerges10 from the behavioral strategic norms of 
various actors, including end users in the aggregate, entities doing business, and the 
technology transactions bar. These forces shape and reshape the comparative power and 
legal strategies in response to changes in the system.  Examining these three types of 
code and their regulation of digital “consent”, this article uses the case study of security-
invasive DRM11 to introduce the benefits of the reasonable digital consumer standard. 
 
Section 1 of this article introduces the challenges computer code presents to 
consent in the intellectual property space using the example of security-invasive DRM.  It 
briefly describes DRM as a common business strategy for preemptively enforcing 
intellectual property rights.  It then explains the negative consequences of this strategy for 
information security of businesses, governments and consumers; one of these negative 
consequences is industry confusion regarding ethical norms of acceptable technology 
business conduct. 
 
9 See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Of Nodes and Power Laws: A Network Theory Approach to Internet 
Jurisdiction Through Data Privacy, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 493, 498 (2004). 
10 Emergence is order that arises from the interactions of individual actors within a complex 
system, demonstrating a global pattern that could not have been forecast simply from understanding the 
behavior of one particular actor.  See, e.g. STEVEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED LIVES OF 
ANTS, BRAINS, CITIES AND SOFTWARE (2001).   
11 For purposes of this article, I define security-invasive DRM to refer to any DRM that changes 
user settings, disables functionality of the user’s PC, and/or does not arrive with an uninstall capability, 
thereby exposing the user to additional security risks in the name of protecting digital content. 
5Section 2 examines legal code and consent, placing the norm confusion described 
in Section 1 in legal context.  Section 2 describes the strain that the emergence of 
security-invasive DRM has placed on copyright law, computer intrusion law, and 
contract law in the United States.  This tension forces us to finally come to terms with the 
preexisting problems of contractual consent and form contracts in digital context.  
Current doctrinal construction of digital consent has analyzed user agreements only on 
grounds related to procedural unconscionability.  This approach is flawed as a matter of 
contract doctrine: procedural and substantive unconscionability must be analyzed 
simultaneously under either Williston’s or Corbin’s standard of unconscionability.  Using 
either of these two approaches, many current user agreements are correctly assessed as 
unconscionable.   
Finally, Section 3 discusses the organizational code emerging at the intersection 
of computer code and legal code in digital contracting.  It posits one possible legal 
approach to reconstructing meaningful consent in digital contracts to solve the problems 
of unconscionability discussed in Section 2: generating an empirical objective 
“reasonable digital consumer” standard by looking to trademark law.  Trademark caselaw 
offers well-established methods for determining whether a “reasonable” consumer is 
confused by a particular trademark or practice; these cases employ empirical testing by 
experts using real consumers.  Importing this “legal usability testing” into digital 
contracting would benefit both users and content owners through creating predictability 
of legal outcome.  Similarly, a reasonable digital consumer standard leverages the 
naturally occurring “hubs” of understanding that both courts and content owners seek to 
generate through form contracts.  The proposed method strikes a successful balance 
6between customization and standardization by using the real understandings of users; it 
also allows for evolution of these understandings over time, as users’ familiarity with 
technology and technology itself advances. 
 
Section 1 Computer Code: DMCA, Emergence of Security-invasive DRM and 
its Negative Consequences 
 
The intersection of intellectual property, computer intrusion and contract law has 
been a heated topic of legal discussion since at least the middle 1990’s12 and the passage 
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).13 DMCA was watershed 
legislation:  it codified the right of content owners to engage in technological self-help 
against would-be copyright infringers.14 Consequently, some content owners have 
adopted a progressively more aggressive intellectual property strategy through digital 
means, using contract law as a backstop. A vivid case study of this dynamic is the latest 
iteration of DRM,15 security-invasive DRM which frequently monitors and 
 
12 One early hotbutton issue at the intersection of intellectual property and data security was the 
so called “Clipper Chip.” See, e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation,  
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Key_escrow/Clipper_III/ (last visited May 3, 2006). 
13 DMCA amended the Copyright Act and was signed into law on October 28, 1998 as the United 
States implementation of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty but 
implemented the treaty in a manner that expanded copyright owners’ protection more than did the 
approaches of other countries to implementation.  See, e.g., Chilling Effects Clearinghouse,  
http://www.chillingeffects.org/anticircumvention/faq.cgi#QID92 (last visited March 9, 2006). 
14 In the perception of the content owners DRM is a permissible self-help mechanism.  In the 
perception of opponents to DRM, it is an illegitimate enclosure of digital commons. See e.g. LAWRENCE 
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE (2004). 
15 For a discussion of legal implications of DRM see, e.g., Dan Burke, Legal and Technical 
Standards in Digital Rights Management Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537 (2005).  
7technologically restricts the behaviors of content users16. Emboldened by anti-
circumvention restrictions of DMCA, DRM technologies have become progressively 
more invasive to the point where their conduct is, on its face, indistinguishable from 
criminal computer intrusion.  The critical legal difference, it is frequently argued, is the 
user’s contractual consent to the form contracts that, at least in theory, authorize the 
conduct.   This consent is usually manifested by the user17 with the click of a mouse, 
ostensibly saying “yes” to a contract that likely cannot be understood by many users and 
usually goes unread.18 Meanwhile, this “consent” in theory indicates the user’s 
agreement to technology conduct19 that might otherwise be considered hacking.  
 
The practice of relying on security-invasive DRM in lieu of subsequent legal action 
may make sense in the eyes of the companies engaging in it.  However, from a 
technology policy perspective this pro-active content enforcement strategy is 
problematic.  Apart from further straining the legitimacy of the regime created by the 
DMCA, these technologies also compromise information security.  This compromise 
involves not only the security of the particular user machines the DRM inhabits, but the 
security of the entire information economy.  Consequently, a conflict in business norms 
 
16 As used herein, “users” include consumers, businesses and governments using the content 
protected by DRM.   
17 A manifestation of consent presumes the consumer is capable of finding the contract to be able 
to review it.  Convention has arisen in the online world that user agreements are not necessarily presented 
in plain site, frequently lurking at the bottom of websites in small font that is not necessarily readily visible 
to users.  Some user agreements are not provided on website homepages.   For an example of a website 
with a user agreement that is not visible from a homepage, see e.g. Google,  http://www.google.com (last 
visited May 13, 2006).  
18 “It is not uncommon for a user to be unable to read the license before proceeding with starting 
up a computer they have just bought (which the computer might require on an on-screen message), because 
no printed copy of the license is included. Users almost invariably click on "Accept" without reading the 
license.”   See Wikipedia, “Software License,”  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EULA (last visited March 9, 
2006). 
19 Security-invasive DRM has been labeled “spyware” in some contexts.  See infra note 43.  
8has arisen regarding the ethical and legal permissibility of this conduct.  This conflict 
highlights that parts of the technology community believe users are not meaningfully 
“consenting” to security-invasive DRM.  
 
A. Emergence of DRM as a Common Intellectual Property Management 
Strategy 
 
Technical control measures limiting copying and use of software have been 
commonplace since the 1980’s.  However, during the 1990’s, as music and movie content 
began to be distributed primarily through digital copies, content owners began to feel a 
sense of urgency for generating effective technological controls on copying and use of 
content.  Technological advances, particularly readily available high-speed internet 
access, changed the business landscape.  Businesses began to view DRM as a necessary 
method of limiting content piracy, ensuring that only paying customers can benefit from 
their digital products.20 
Users of any form of DRM point to widespread content piracy throughout the world21 
and inadequacy of law in policing it. They assert digital self-help through DRM is their 
best hope to protect content from piracy. Meanwhile, opponents of DRM have long 
argued against it on the principle that technology should be unfettered and that the 
affirmative defense of fair use prevents recovery of damages in many claims of copyright 
 
20 See, e.g., Recording Industry of America Association,  
http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/default.asp (last visited March 9, 2006). 
21 For example, it is estimated that over 90% of software consists of pirated copies in Vietnam and 
22% of software in the United States is pirated.  See, e.g., NationMaster,  
http://www.nationmaster.com/graph-T/cri_sof_pir_rat (last visited March 9, 2006).  
9infringement asserted by content owners.22 Similarly, opponents have pointed to 
technological disadvantages that DRM can bring, such as limiting functionality of 
applications, shortening battery life, 23 crippling the development of future computing 
architecture24 and now, perhaps most seriously, possible security compromise of user 
machines.  Similarly, black markets for exploit code breaking DRM are arising;  in other 
words, code to circumvent DRM has acquired monetary value as a black market 
commodity.25 
The mainstreaming of the internet and ease of digital file transfer has further 
catalyzed content owners’ efforts to create “unbreakable” digital content protection 
mechanisms.  Consequently, several prominent technological failures of DRM have 
occurred, including one DRM scheme that was easily broken simply by writing along the 
circumference of a CD with a permanent marker.26 Upon this technological backdrop, 
the DMCA27 came into effect as the legal redundancy28 to the technological copying 
restrictions of DRM.29 As the DMCA debate continued in the legal community, 
 
22 See Electronic Frontier Foundation,  http://www.eff.org (last visited March 9, 2006). 
23 DRM cuts battery life short, SECURITYFOCUS, March 17, 2006,  
http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/166 .
24 For a discussion of the systemic limitations DRM may impose on innovation and open 
architectures see, e.g. Center for Democracy and Technology, Protecting Copyright and Internet Values,  
http://www.cdt.org/copyright/20050607framing.pdf (last visited May 1, 2006). 
25 For a discussion of the relationship between technology black markets and intellectual property, 
see e.g. Annalee Newitz, The High Tech Black Market, San Francisco Bay Guardian, December 18, 2003,  
http://www.alternet.org/columnists/story/17424/ .
26 Christian rockers risk wrath of DMCA with DRM tips, REGISTER, September 21, 2005,  
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/09/21/christian_rockers_drm_tips/ .
27 17 U.S.C. Sect. 1201 et seq. 
28 In computer terminology, redundancy means having additional duplicate components to 
improve the functionality of systems or as backup in case the initial component fails.  See, e.g. Institute for 
Telecommunications Science,  http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/fs-1037/dir-030/_4477.htm (last visited May 1, 
2006). 
29 For a discussion of DMCA and DRM, see., e.g., Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management 
in the United States and in Europe, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 323 (2004)(arguing statutory limitations to the 
different means of DRM protection seem necessary); Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in 
Digital Rights Management Technologies, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537 (2005)(examined social costs of 
deploying digital rights management systems to protect copyrighted content); Julie Cohen, DRM and 
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prosecutions under it began.   For example, in one (in)famous case, a Russian national 
was arrested at a technology security conference in Las Vegas in 1999 for posting code 
on the internet that broke a DRM scheme.30 
These DMCA prosecutions attest that the technological knowledge to break DRM 
encryption schemes is likely to be possessed by many people apart from the creators of 
the DRM in question.   Workarounds reminded content owners that users of their content 
would not necessarily idly accept DRM; until DRM runs on tamper-resistent hardware,31 
digital content will remain vulnerable to copying by technologically adept, determined 
users.  Thus, undoubtedly in frustration at the arms race between authors and breakers of 
DRM, content owners and DRM authors have started to resort to copyright protections in 
DRM that attempts to leverage security through obscurity32: in the words of one content 
 
Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575 (2003)(arguing that with some adjustments, DRM technologies 
could be harnessed to protect privacy); Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Digital Rights Management:  Many Technical 
Controls on Digitlal Content Distribution Can Create a Surveillance Society, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. 
REV. 1 (2004)(arguing DRM could lead to a "surveillance" society and proposing eight policy principles to 
extend privacy protection to the distribution of digital media); Jacqueline Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy 
Puzzle:  Disaggregating Fair Use from DMCA’s Anti-Device Provisions, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 111 
(2005)(setting forth a new administrative complaints procedure and suggesting that the nature and scope of 
the fair use doctrine needs to be more fully developed for the doctrine to be a meaningful part of copyright 
law in the digital age);   Joseph P. Liu, The DMCA and the Regulation of Scientific Research, 18 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 501 (2003)(arguing that encryption researchers should be able to conduct and publish certain 
types of research without significant fear of liability under the DMCA); Declan McCullagh and Milana 
Homsi, Leave DRM Alone:  A Survey of Legislative Proposals Relating to Digital Rights Management 
Technology and Their Problems, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 317 (2005)( surveying both the pro-DRM and 
anti-DRM remedies and argue that both camps are mistaken and Congress should remain neutral and 
refrain from setting industrial policy);  R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering the DMCA, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1107 
(2005)(arguing that the DMCA might, contrary to the conventional wisdom, actually limit the development 
and deployment of DRM in the field of copyrighted goods).  
30 For a list of DMCA prosecutions see, e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation,  
http://www.eff.org/legal/recent_legal.html .
31 See Trusting DRM Software, W3C,  http://www.w3.org/2000/12/drm-ws/pp/cloakware.html
(last visited March 2, 2006). 
32 “Security through obscurity” is the idea that adequate security should be driven by the 
subjective beliefs of the owners of a system regarding the security of that system.  Therefore, if the owners 
believe that particular security flaws of the system are not widely known or inconsequential, then it must be 
the case that attackers are unlikely to find and exploit them as long as the owners keep information about 
the vulnerabilities secret. “Security through obscurity” is discredited in the tech community. See, e.g., 
University of California at Irvine, www.isr.uci.edu/projects/swrl/ (last visited November 29, 2004).  
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owner, “[i]f consumers even know there's a DRM, what it is, and how it works, we've 
already failed.”33 
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the newest wave of DRM tries to hide itself 
and uses coding techniques that have traditionally been the domain of hackers. New 
variants of DRM trigger the urgent need to reconfigure the balance among copyright 
protection, consumer protection and contractual consent.  
 
B. Negative Consequences of Security-Invasive DRM for Information 
Security 
 
While hacking was usually associated with users attempting to circumvent DRM 
technologies, in the last year, the tables have turned.  DRM schemes have themselves 
begun to use tactics of hackers and malware authors.34 These new breeds of DRM intend 
not only to prevent users from disabling the DRM but, more ominously, to prevent users 
from even knowing that the DRM has been installed and is operating in the background 
on their machines.35 In just the last year, over 500,000 systems have been made 
vulnerable to remote compromise due to DRM that behaves like malicious code36 across 
 
33 See infra note 35. 
34 Two sets of Sony DRM  were implicated -- XCP  and SunnComm's Media Max version 5.  See 
e.g. Brian Krebs, Study of Sony Anti-Piracy Software Triggers Uproar File-Hiding Technique Alarms 
Security Researchers; Developer Offers Patch, Washington Post, November 2, 2005,   
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/02/AR2005110202362.html.
35 See, e.g.  Peter Lee, executive at Disney, as quoted in Science Fiction, The Economist, 
September 1, 2005  http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=4342418.
36 Over 200,000 copies of the program are installed on computers in Japan, 130,000 in the 
United States, 44,000 in the United Kingdom, 27,000 copies in the Netherlands and Spain, and between 
8,000 and 12,000 in each of Korea, Peru, France, Australia and Switzerland.  See, e.g. Paul F. Roberts, 
Sony's 'Rootkit' Is on 500,000 Systems, Expert Says, eWeek, November 15, 2005,   
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1887181,00.asp?kc=EWRSS03119TX1K0000594
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135 countries.37 These systems have included systems within the military and 
government, including the U.S. Department of Defense.38 
Specifically, several recent DRM products have included features that monitor and 
remotely report user behaviors, in the name of intellectual property protection.  These 
products can install remotely executable code, change settings on user machines, hide 
themselves within other programs, provide no means of uninstallation, expose the user to 
security threats from malicious third parties by creating vulnerabilities on the user’s 
machine, and communicate personal user information from the user’s computer to the 
content owner.39 Frequently, even as the companies using these stealth DRM tactics 
released uninstallers, they have been unapologetic for the security-invasive DRM itself,40 
signaling an unwillingness to give up security-invasive DRM as an intellectual property 
strategy.  In at least one case, after the DRM’s methodology was made known to the 
public, the company responsible for it provided an uninstaller that itself further 
compromised user machines41 and allowed remote third parties to take control of the 
 
37 Robert Lemos, Researcher: Sony BMG rootkit still widespread: 'The global scope is the big 
mystery here', SECURITYFOCUS, January 16, 2005,  
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/01/16/sony_bmg_rootkit_still_widespread/
38 Bruce Schneier, Real Story of the Rogue Rootkit, WIRED, Nov. 17, 2005 
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,69601,00.html . US-CERT, part of the US Department of 
Homeland Security advised consumers not to install software from an audio CD. See US-CERT,  
http://www.us-cert.gov/current/current_activity.html#xcpdrm (last visited May 2, 2006). See also supra 
note 2. 
39 Hiawatha Bray, Security firm: Sony CDs secretly install spyware, Company denies it, saying 
program aims to foil music piracy, Boston Globe, November 8, 2005,  
http://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2005/11/08/security_firm_sony_cds_secretly_install_s
pyware/ .
40 "Most people, I think, don't even know what a rootkit is, so why should they care about it?" the 
head of Sony BMG's global digital business, Thomas Hesse, told National Public Radio.  See, e.g.,  Brian 
Bergstein, Copy Protection Still a Work in Progress, ABCNEWS, November 18, 2005, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory?id=1326791&page=1 .
41 J. Alex Halderman, Not Again! Uninstaller for Other Sony DRM Also Opens Huge Security 
Hole, November 17, 2005,  http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=931
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machines where the uninstaller had been used, turning them into “bots”. 42 Once 
machines become bots, they can be stealthily harnessed into networks for attacking other 
machines.  Thus, the costs of security-invasive DRM go beyond an individual user’s 
machine.    
Meanwhile other technology companies have classified this type of DRM as 
“spyware.”  Some companies have even released their own uninstallation tools for 
removing the offending code, not trusting the authors of the security-invasive DRM to fix 
the problems they have caused.43 Consumer groups have filed several lawsuits and state 
attorney general actions are currently in process resulting from at least one such DRM 
incident.44 
These technology-driven dynamics demonstrate two business trends that impact 
construction of digital consent.  First, the rise of security-invasive DRM points to 
progressive technological similarity of tactics used by legitimate business and criminal 
computer code authors.  Identically functioning code can be pushed forth either by a 
 
42 Uninstallers to the Sony DRM allowed remote third parties to take control of PC’s where the 
uninstaller was used.  J. Alex Halderman, Not Again! Uninstaller for Other Sony DRM Also Opens Huge 
Security Hole, November 17, 2005,  http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=931 Meanwhile, virus writers 
produced a Trojan which took advantage of the Sony-BMG rootkit and users who clicked on an alleged 
photograph in an email installed malicious software, which then connected to the Internet Relay Chat chat 
network and opened up a channel to control the infected computer. John Leyden, First Trojan using Sony 
DRM spotted. Roots you, Sir, REGISTER, November 10, 2005,  
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/11/10/sony_drm_trojan/; John Borland, 'Bots' for Sony CD software 
spotted online, CNET News.com, November 10, 2005, 
http://news.com.com/Bots+for+Sony+CD+software+spotted+online/2100-1029_3-5944643.html ; Tom 
Espiner, Trojan horses targeting Sony DRM rootkit found, ZDNET UK November 10, 2005 
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/internet/security/0,39020375,39236720,00.htm.
43 Microsoft classified Sony BMG’s DRM as spyware and provided an uninstallation tool. See, 
e.g., Microsoft to Remove BMG Code, BBC November 14, 2005,  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4434852.stm .
44 Class action suits were filed against Sony BMG in New York and California. The Texas 
Attorney General also brought legal action against Sony BMG. New York and Sony reached a tentative 
settlement. See, e.g., Sony sued over copy-protected CDs,  BBC News, November 10, 2005  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4424254.stm; Associated Press, Sony BMG Tentatively Settles Suits 
On Spyware, N.Y.TIMES, December 30, 2005   
http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F20C10F938540C738FDDAB0994DD404482 .
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multinational business or an information criminal.  Just as information criminals push 
code to monitor user conduct onto user machines, so security-invasive DRM to monitor 
user conduct has been installed on user machines, in some instances prior to presenting 
the user with a User Agreement.45 
Second, the technology business community lacks consensus about acceptable 
conduct and about the role of User Agreements.  The companies that have classified 
security-invasive DRM as spyware and released removal tools are either explicitly or 
implicitly condemning invasive DRM as a violation of ethical business conduct.   
Similarly, their actions question the practical impact of User Agreements, arguing that 
had their users understood the implications of the DRM, they would not have consented 
to its installation.  This meaning comes bundled with the label of “spyware:” spyware is 
an application that is not consensually installed by a user.46 
These two technology trends demonstrate that noise47 exists in the business 
community about the role and operationalization of digital consent. Just as Congress 
struggles with generating clear legal standards for delineating what behaviors made a 
piece of code illegal, so too the technology community is struggling with the extent of 
necessary disclosure about code’s behavior to users.     This set of evolving standards 
 
45 The XCP software installed before the EULA appeared, and the EULA does not mention the 
XCP software explicitly.  See, e.g.,  Mark Russinovich and Bryce Cogswell, Sony, Rootkits and Digital 
Rights Management Gone Too Far, Sysinternals, October 31, 2005,  
http://www.sysinternals.com/blog/2005/10/sony-rootkits-and-digital-rights.html .
46 For example, if a content provider asks “Do you want to play this CD?” without clearly 
explaining that certain PC functionality will be permanently disabled as a consequence, is this qualitatively 
different from a phishing email?  When a phishing email arrives in a user’s inbox asking “Do you want us 
to reset your password?” and the user may click yes, they are “consenting” to their information being 
shared with the fraudster.  It can be argued that these two types of consent situations are not materially 
different; in both the user is not clear on long run consequences of consent. 
47 The term “noise” refers to any disturbance tending to interfere with the normal operation of a device 
or system.  See, e.g., Miriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/noise (last 
visited May 2, 2006). 
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becomes complicated further when layered on to preexisting tensions in copyright law, 
computer intrusion law, and contract law.    
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Section 2 Legal Code: Current Doctrinal Tensions in Intellectual Property Law, 
Computer Intrusion Law, and Contract Law 
 
As explained above, noise exists in the technology community regarding ethical 
lines of disclosure, conduct and obtaining meaningful user consent.  Similarly, noise also 
exists in the way the law defines digital consent.  Due to technologies such as security-
invasive DRM and the contracts that accompany them, doctrinal legal tensions are 
straining three bodies of law – copyright law, computer intrusion law, and contract law in 
the United States.  
Part of law’s contribution to this information security paradox of consumer “consent” 
results from labels for doctrinal concepts in law crossing legal disciplines. Conceptual 
meanings, however, unlike the labels, are frequently generated independently by legal 
disciplines, developed by different legal actors in an uncoordinated manner.  Eventually 
these compartmentalized legal regimes bump into each other, and “noise” occurs in our 
system.  Noise currently exists in intellectual property and technology regulation doctrine 
in the way law defines “consent.”  This doctrinal tension has become painfully visible 
because of recent developments in DRM.  The legal line between permissible copyright 
self-defense on the one hand and computer intrusion on the other turns solely on users’ 
digital consent. This doctrinal noise forces us to address the preexisting problems relating 
to contractual consent and form agreements or contracts of adhesion in digital context. 
 
A. Copyright Law, Theory and Preemptive Self-Defense 
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The Constitution gives Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”48 Under this power, Congress has enacted 
copyright legislation, in particular the Copyright Act49 as amended by the DMCA.50 
Although the Copyright Act entitles the owner of a copyright to the exclusive right to 
reproduce, distribute, display, perform, and license the copyrighted work,51 Section 107 
of the Copyright Act places a limit on this “exclusive right,” through an exception for 
certain uses52 that give rise to the idea that certain types of “fair use” exist, which allow a 
person to copy material s/he has purchased within the parameters provided by the 
Copyright Act.53 Copyright holders frequently view their protections more expansively 
than users,54 arguing for aggressive interpretations of what it means to commit piracy. 55 
48 U.S. Constitution Article I, Sect. 8 
49 17 USC  101 et seq.  
50 17 USC 1201 et seq.  
51 17 USC 101 et seq. 
52 These uses include such acts that relate to criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, 
scholarship and research.  Id.  See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
53 Id.  
54 Copyright holders often believe that there are no privileges or exemptions related to the usage 
of copyrighted works.  See, e.g. RIAA, www.riaa.org (last visited May 23, 2006).  
55 For a discussion of the evolving role of intellectual property rights in the digital age, see, e.g., 
Margo Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 469 (2003); Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, Or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 
YALE L.J. 369 (2002); Julie Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347 
(2005);Rochelle Cooper Dreyfus, Warren and Brandeis Redux:  Finding (More) Privacy Protection in 
Intellectual Property Lore, 1999 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 8 (1999); William W. Fisher, Reconstructing the 
Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV.L.REV. 1659 (1998); Jane Ginsburg, Legal Protection of Techcnological 
Measures Protecting Works of Authorship:  International Obligations and the US Experience, 29 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 11 (2005);Wendy Gordon,  Render Copyright Unto Caesar:  On Taking Incentives Seriously, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75 (2004);  Sonia Katyal, Privacy vs. Piracy, 7 YALE J. L. & TECH. 222 (2004); Mark 
Lemley, What’s Different About Intellectual Property?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (2005); Jessica Litman, 
Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 1 (2004); Robert Merges, One Hundred Years of 
Solitude:  Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187 (2000);  Eben Moglen, Freeing the 
Mind: Free Software and the Death of Proprietary Culture, 56 ME. L. REV. 1 (2004);Carol M. Rose, The 
Sevevral Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN.
L. REV. 129 (1998);  Pamela Samuelson, Toward a New Deal for Copyright in the Information Age, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 1488 (2002); Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485 
(2004); Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L. REV. 609 (2006); Eugene 
Volokh, The Trojan Doctrine:  Trademarks and the Law of the Horse, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 259 (2003); 
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DMCA fueled this perception further.  Specifically, DMCA contains, among other things, 
an anticircumvention provision that criminalizes circumvention of “a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under [DMCA]”   as well as 
“manufactur[ing], import[ing], offer[ing] to the public, provid[ing], or otherwise 
traffic[king] in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof…for 
the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a 
work protected under [DMCA].”56 However, from the plain language of the statute, 
Congress did not intend DMCA protections for technological self-help measures to be 
absolute and included exceptions in the statute covering security research and 
“spyware”.57 
Though perceived by some as providing the necessary legal support for content 
protection and a supportable extension of copyright law, others view DMCA and its anti-
 
R. Polk Wagner, The Perfect Storm:  Intellectual Property and Public Values, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 423 
(2005); Christopher Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212 (2004);  Peter K. 
Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1 (2005); Diane 
Leenheer Zimmerman, Daddy, Are We There Yet? Lost in Grokster-Land, N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y
75 (2005). Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1
(2005); Jonathan Zittrain, Normative Principles for Evaluating Free and Proprietary Software, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 265 (2004). 
56 17 USC 1201 et seq. 
57 The language of the DMCA states that “it is not a violation…for a person to circumvent a 
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work…if(i) Protection of Personally Identifying 
Information. (1) Circumvention permitted. - Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(1)(A), it is 
not a violation of that subsection for a person to circumvent a technological measure that effectively 
controls access to a work protected under this title, if - (A) the technological measure, or the work it 
protects, contains the capability of collecting or disseminating personally identifying information reflecting 
the online activities of a natural person who seeks to gain access to the work protected; (B) in the normal 
course of its operation, the technological measure, or the work it protects, collects or disseminates 
personally identifying information about the person who seeks to gain access to the work protected, without 
providing conspicuous notice of such collection or dissemination to such person, and without providing 
such person with the capability to prevent or restrict such collection or dissemination; (C) the act of 
circumvention has the sole effect of identifying and disabling the capability described in subparagraph (A), 
and has no other effect on the ability of any person to gain access to any work; and (D) the act of 
circumvention is carried out solely for the purpose of preventing the collection or dissemination of 
personally identifying information about a natural person who seeks to gain access to the work protected, 
and is not in violation of any other law.  (2) Inapplicability to certain technological measures. - This 
subsection does not apply to a technological measure, or a work it protects, that does not collect or 
disseminate personally identifying information and that is disclosed to a user as not having or using such 
capability.” Id.  
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circumvention provisions in particular as crossing the line into curtailing conduct 
previously defensible under fair use.58 Let us assume that a reasonable argument could 
be made in favor of non-invasive DRM using the historical justifications for copyright. In 
other words, let us presume for the moment that technological self-defense of intellectual 
property promotes economic and social welfare in the aggregate, defends the moral right 
of an author in the fruits of that creator’s labor, and furthers creators’ self-realization by 
limiting others’ uses of the intellectual property to those uses explicitly allowed by the 
author.  However, even if one is to assume that these justifications have merit in the 
context of non-security-invasive DRM, they falter in the case of security-invasive DRM.      
Security-invasive DRM fails to strike a balance between the rights of an author and 
the good of innovation generally; through security-invasive DRM one content owner 
potentially limits the ability of users to consume other authors’ work or to generate 
independent digital work.  On a large scale, an information economy composed of users 
with security compromised, crippled machines due to invasive DRM benefits no one.  
Innovation is stifled and security threats include identity theft, fraud and compromised 
machines being harnessed for denial of service59 and other attacks.  As such, neither 
economic efficiency nor self-realization of content creators is maximized when DRM 
crosses into the realm of security-invasiveness.  
 The DMCA exception relating to impermissible spyware has received little attention 
to date but is perhaps most on point in considering issues of security-invasive DRM. 
 
58 For a discussion of how opponents of DRM believe it to be encroaching on fair use, see, e.g., 
Electronic Frontier Foundation,  http://www.eff.org (last visited May 2, 2006) .
59 A denial of service attack is a type of attack where a malicious user, process, or system attempts to 
prevent legitimate users from accessing a network resource by exploiting a weakness in a system through  
e.g. flooding network connections, filling disk storage, disabling ports, or removing power.    For a 
discussion of service provider liability and denial of service attacks, see, e.g., Doug Lichtman, Eric Posner, 
Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 221 (2006). 
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DMCA exempts from the definition of a prohibited circumvention the act of disabling 
DRM that collects personally identifiable information about a user. This exception 
implicates other bodies of law through notions of contractual consent: the framing of the 
exception relies on lack of “conspicuous notice” to the user.  However, the exception is 
written narrowly, allowing disabling of the DRM only if the sole effect of the disabling 
pertains to the data collection features, does not provide any additional access to the work 
and only to the extent that the DRM was without “conspicuous notice of…collection or 
dissemination [of personally identifiable information], and without providing [the user] 
with the capability to prevent or restrict such collection or dissemination.”60 In essence, 
though, if DRM behaves in a manner described by this preceding provision without 
consent, it may fit both the statutory definition of “spyware” in many states’ anti-spyware 
statutes61 and, in some cases, will likely qualify as a criminal and civil computer 
intrusion.    Thus, the determinative fact is whether a user meaningfully consented.    
 
B. Computer Intrusion Law and Theory 
 
Just as in tort and criminal law generally, what constitutes an intrusion or an 
unwanted technological “touching” of a user’s machine is contingent entirely on user 
consent.  The language used by computer intrusion statutes revolves around 
 
60 17 USC 1201 et seq. 
61 Definitions of spyware vary across legislation.  For a discussion of spyware legislative efforts, see, 
e.g., California Goes After Spyware, WIRED, October 2, 2004,  
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,65203,00.html (last visited March 15, 2005). Spyware can be 
embedded as part of other products installed by the user.  As such, it can bury itself into users’ hard drives 
in a manner which makes them difficult to ferret out and uninstall.  Like sniffers, these programs then 
convey information back to their author.  For a discussion of the definitional complexity of spyware see,
e.g., Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spyware (last visited November 30, 2004).  For a definition 
of sniffers, see, e.g., Webopedia, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/s/sniffer.html (last visited November 
30, 2004). 
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“interception,” i.e. monitoring without consent, and “exceeding authorized access,” 
meaning surpassing the extent of consent. 62 Two federal statutes, as well as a patchwork 
of state statutes, use this framework of consent in the context of criminal and civil 
computer intrusion – the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) and the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”).    DRM and other technology that collects 
data about users’ behaviors without explicit user consent to the monitoring may be 
engaging in acts that are prohibited under both ECPA and CFAA.  Consequently, a 
finding of a legal circumvention under DMCA can be construed to simultaneously mean 
a violation of ECPA or CFAA.   
 For example, the ECPA has been applied to business conduct, most recently to email 
providers who have read and copied contents of user emails to their business advantage, 
exceeding the expectations of users created by the operative User Agreement.63 
62 See infra notes 61 and 62. 
63 See United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005).   ECPA is composed of Title I, 
amendments to the Wiretap Act,63 and Title II, the Stored Communications Act.18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 
(2000). Generally, the Wiretap Act prohibits interception of communications, including those in transient 
storage. "Except as otherwise specifically provided in" the Act, "electronic communication[s]," which are 
defined expansively, may not be "intercepted." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). An exception is provided for 
electronic communication service providers, but it only applies to "activity which is a necessary incident to 
the rendition of [the] service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service." 18 
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i). The Stored Communications Act restricts accessing communications that reside in a 
particular system. The U.S. Patriot Act clarified at least one existing possible ambiguity in the language of 
the Stored Communications Act, explicitly including voicemail messages under its coverage.  Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
(U.S.A. Patriot) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). The Stored Communications Act's 
main criminal provision reads as follows: “(a) Offense. Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section 
whoever-- (1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic 
communication service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and 
thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in 
electronic storage in such system shall be punished. . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 2701(a).   The Stored 
Communications Act's contains an explicit “provider” exception: "Subsection (a) of this section does not 
apply with respect to conduct authorized (1) by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic 
communications service." Id. § 2701(c). It has been argued that this § 2701(c)(1) establishes almost 
complete immunity for a service provider that "obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to" e-mail that 
is "in electronic storage" in its system. See Fraser, 352 F.3d at 115 ("[W]e read § 2701(c) literally to except 
from Title II's protection all searches by communications service providers."). A second provision of the 
Stored Communications Act prohibits "a person or entity providing an electronic communication service to 
the public [from] knowingly divulg[ing] to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in 
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Similarly, Section 1030 of CFAA is usually associated with criminal prosecution of 
hacking offenses, however, the civil and criminal offense arising out of “unauthorized 
access” to computer systems as well as the “transmission” of harmful code 64 can apply to 
business practices as well.  For instance, a wide range of relatively common business 
practices have been challenged in civil suits under Section 1030, including automated 
searches,65 dropping cookies,66 sending spam,67 changing hosts’ communication 
configurations,68 and port scanning.69 These same behaviors, some of which are 
 
electronic storage by that service." 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1). This provision also has service provider 
exceptions, permitting a provider to give access to an electronic communication "to a person employed or 
authorized or whose facilities are used to forward such communication to its destination," id. § 2702(b)(4), 
or "as may be necessarily incident to the rendition of the service or to the protection of the rights or 
property of the provider of that service," id. § 2702(b)(5). Some confusion exists regarding the interaction 
of the two statutes and certain potential definitional ambiguities. Most recently the interaction of the two 
parts of the ECPA was discussed in United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005).  Bradford 
Councilman was a bookseller who provided a free email service to his customers.  Councilman directed his 
employees to intercept and copy all incoming communications to their customers from Amazon.com. The 
system administrator modified the server's procmail recipe to copy the message and place the copy in a 
separate mailbox that Councilman could access prior to customers’ receiving the emails for the purpose of 
gaining competitive advantage over Amazon.com.   Ultimately, although Councilman was found to have 
violated the Wiretap Act, the appeals court construed the provider exceptions to the Stored 
Communications Act liberally and deemed Councilman to fall within them.  The appeals court overruled 
the lower court, concluding that the term "electronic communication" as used in the Wiretap Act includes 
transient electronic storage integral to the communication process, and that, therefore, an interception of an 
e-mail message in this transient storage is an offense under the Wiretap Act.   
64 For a discussion of the current state of criminal computer intrusion statutes see, e.g., Susan Brenner, 
Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace:  Distributed Security, 10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1 (2004); Orin S. 
Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596 (2003).  See also Neal Kumar Katyal, Digital Architecture as Crime Control, 112 
YALE L.J. 2261 (2003). 
65 REGISTER.com v. Verio, Inc., 126 F.Supp.2d 238, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); eBay v. Bidder’s Edge, 100 
F.Supp.2d 1058 (N.D.Cal. 2000); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001) . 
66 In re Intuit Privacy Litig.,138 F Supp 2d 1272 (CD Cal 2001); Chance v. Ave. A, Inc., 165 
F.Supp.2d 1153 (WD Wash 2001). 
67 America Online v. National Health Care Discount, 121 F.Supp.2d 1255, 1273 (N.D. Iowa 2000); 
Christian v Sony Corp.of Am., 152 F Supp 2d 1184, 1187 (DC Minn. 2001) 
68 See, e.g.,In re AOL, Inc.Version 5.0 Software Litig., 168 F Supp 2d 1359 (SD Fla. 2001) (AOL’s 
transmission of its Version 5 software which allegedly "changes" the host system's communications 
configuration and settings to interfere with non-AOL communications and services deemed actionable 
under 1030(a)(5)(A)); Christian v Sony Corp. of Am., 152 F Supp 2d 1184, 1187 (DC Minn. 2001) 
(deeming the inclusion of a defective FDC constituted a “transmission” within the meaning of section 
1030). 
69 See “County Cuts Off Computer Network”, Houston Chronicle, by Steve Brewer, March 21, 2002,  
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/topstory/1302663#top . See also, “Ethical Hacker Faces War 
Driving Charges”, The REGISTER, by John Leyden, July 26, 2002,  
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/tech/news/1507766 . See also Ann Harrison, “Plea Agreement In 
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behaviors of security-invasive DRM, may run afoul of computer intrusion law unless 
prior consent of the system owner is obtained.   
Similarly, behaviors prohibited in state spyware statutes include behaviors exhibited 
by security-invasive DRM.   More than ten states have passed anti-spyware statutes.70 
These statutes vary in their definition of “spyware” as well as in the regulatory 
approaches they adopt but generally also focus on prohibited behavior as behavior that 
lacks user consent.  They set forth prohibitions on various conduct including software 
that changes user settings, software that is uninstallable, software that usurps user control 
of a machine, and software that sends data to remote third parties, among others. 71 In 
other words, they criminally prohibit the behaviors exhibited by security-invasive DRM 
without user consent. 
 
C. Contract Law and Theory 
 
The legal nexus of digital consent is contract law.  For many bodies of law, the 
technology revolution has added a complicating factor to the legal equation;  in contract 
law, the uneasy peace of doctrine around form contracts/ contracts of adhesion has been 
 
Distributed Computing Case”, SECURITYFOCUS, Jan 18, 2002  http://www.securityfocus.com/news/311. As 
a result, computer security professionals fear that distributed computing itself may be illegal. See “Is 
Distributed Computing A Crime?”, SECURITYFOCUS, by Ann Harrison, December 20, 2001  
http://www.securityfocus.com/news/300 (last visited December 21, 2005). 
70 To date, despite several attempts, no federal statute explicitly addresses spyware.   See e.g. Paul M. 
Schwartz, Privacy Inalienability and the Regulation of Spyware, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1269 (2005); 
Patricia L. Bellia, Spyware and the Limits of Surveillance Law, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1283 (2005);  Jane 
K. Winn, Contracting Spyware by Contract, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345 (2005); Susan B. Crawford, 
First Do No Harm:  The Problem of Spyware, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1433 (2005). 
71 Id. 
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permanently disrupted. 72 As seen in the context of DRM, it is user consent to a form 
digital contract that usually creates a critical legal distinction between legal and illegal 
digital conduct. 
 
1.   Why digital consent and technology-mediated form contracts are 
different from real space form contracts 
 
It is true that technology contracting triggers the age-old form contract doctrinal 
debate of customization versus standardization.   However, the contours of this debate are 
altered in a digital medium.   As Professor Radin has pointed out in the context of the 
 
72 For a discussion of the tension between freedom of contract and consumer protection see, e.g.,  Ian 
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 
YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (discussing significance of distinction between default and mandatory rules for 
consumers); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. 
REV. 821 (1992) (describing a "conflict between the two aspects of the liberal conception of contractual 
freedom: freedom to contract and freedom from contract" (citing Richard E. Speidel, The New Spirit of 
Contract, 2 J.L. & COM. 193, 194 (1982)).); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton 
Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) 
(asserting that rules created by trade association to govern contractual disputes diverge from rules 
contained in Article 2 of U.C.C.); Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of 
Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989)(discussing the role of default rules); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The 
Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 252 (1995) ("…the problem raised 
by contracts to govern thick relationships is not a problem of unconscionability. Usually, neither party to 
such a relationship will have exploited the other at the time the contract was made. Quite the contrary, both 
parties will have probably been subject to exactly the same cognitive limits."); Christine Jolls, Contracts as 
Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 203, 205 (1997)  
("Contrary to traditional wisdom, the parties to a contract may be better off if the law enables them to tie 
their hands, or ties their hands for them, in a way that prevents them from taking advantage of certain ex 
post profitable modification opportunities."); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and 
Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995) (describing network effects and the potential for 
suboptimal contracts); Zvika Neeman, The Freedom to Contract and the Free-Rider Problem, 15 J.L. Econ. 
& Org. 685 (1999)(arguing that a person contracting with multiple actors can induce them to refrain from 
acting in their collective interest); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three 
Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 842 (2003) ("The premises of economics push in the 
direction of freedom of contract, and this current can be resisted only with difficulty."); Alan Schwartz & 
Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 619 (2003) (arguing 
that mandatory contract rules should center on regulating contracts tinged by unconscionability, fraud, or 
duress, and contracts that create externalities).  
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internet,73 the internet’s increasing content customization in transactions is perhaps 
fundamentally incompatible with content owners’ need for predictability in outcome and 
reliance on standardization through form contracts.   
Technology-mediated contracting is a qualitatively different experience for users than 
real space contracting.74 Individuals who might attempt to read a form contract in real 
space may behave differently in technology-mediated contracting contexts.75 Unlike in 
many real space contract situations, inputs in technology contracting scenarios are 
impoverished:  parties to contracts mediated by technology are rarely in the same room or 
in contact through any real time method.  No humans are readily accessible; asking 
questions about the meaning of contractual terms becomes a cumbersome if not 
impossible undertaking. The importance of objective indicators of consent plays a greater 
role in virtual space than it might in real space.   However, even objective consent 
determinations by courts have limitations in digital context.  For example, unlike in real 
space where each form contract copy is physically identical, “objective” factors, such as 
the size of text on a screen, may vary from computer to computer.   
 
73 See Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and Machine, 70 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1125 (2002). See also Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and 
Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 719-20 
(1997). 
74 See, e.g. comments of Michael M. Maney, United States and International Perspectives on 
Electronic Marketplaces, 14-Aut Inlprac 68, 74 (2001).   For discussion of business and consumer concerns 
in particular technology contracting contexts, see, e.g., Anita Allen, Minor Distractions: Childred, Privacy 
and e-Commerce, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 751 (2001); Jay P. Kesan, Andres A. Gallo, The Market for Private 
Dispute Resolution Services – An Empirical Assessment of ICANN-UDRP Performance, 11 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 285 (2005); Anita Ramasastry, State Escheat Statutes and Possible Treatment 
of Stored Value, Electronic Currency, and other New Payment Mechanisms, 57 BUS. LAW. 475 (2001); 
Ronald J. Mann, “Contracting” for Credit, 104 MICH. L. REV. 899 (2006); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy 
of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006); Peter P. Swire, A Theory of Disclosure for Security and 
Competitive Reasons: Open Source, Proprietary Software, and Government Systems, 42 HOUS. L. REV.
1333 (2006).  
75 Users behave differently in real and virtual space.  For example, although most people would be 
hesitant to share the keys to their home with others or use the same key for both the door to their home and 
office, users engage in password sharing for websites frequently and use the same password for multiple 
websites usually.  See, e.g., Shannon Riley, Password Security:  What Users Know and What They Actually 
Do, USABILITY NEWS, August 1, 2006,  http://psychology.wichita.edu/surl/usabilitynews/81/Passwords.htm
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Therefore, new technologies have generated challenges to determining meaningful 
consent, challenges that exist in digital form contracts but do not exist in real space form 
contracts.  As a consequence, the risks of unconscionability in digital form contracts are 
meaningfully higher than risks in real space contracts.    The state of current digital 
contracting doctrine does not adequately reflect these subtleties.  In the context of 
technology-mediated contracts and avoiding unconscionability, a stronger medium-
specific contract doctrine of consent is needed. 
 
2. The current state of digital contracting doctrine 
 
To date courts have approached analysis of digital consent by focusing on objective 
procedural aspects of digital consent.  Currently, courts are building doctrine around 
procedural fairness of digital consent through four lead cases – ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenberg,76 REGISTER.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.,77 Specht v. Netscape Communications 
Corp.,78 and the most recent iteration of Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc.79 These 
cases discuss the process of formation from an objective perspective and, specifically, 
whether a reasonable user is likely to have known digital consent was being given.80 
In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, an individual purchased software that displayed license 
terms in a “clickwrap” format81 on the computer screen every time the user executed the 
 
76 86 F.Supp.2d 1165 (7th Cir. 1996).   
77 126 F. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d as modified 356 F.3d 393 (2nd Cir. 2004). 
78 150 F.Supp.2d 585 (S.D.N.Y.2001), aff’d 306 F.3d 17 (2nd Cir. 2002). 
79 2003 WL 21406289, 2003 Copr.L.Dec. P 28,607 (C.D.Cal., Mar 07, 2003).   
80 None of these cases have focused on the inability to negotiate the terms of these User 
Agreements.  Nonnegotiability is a hallmark of contracts of adhesion and is a factor that may demonstrate 
procedural unconscionability of a contract.  
81 Clickwrap is the term used to describe an agreement presentation that appears in a window 
which opens to reveal the text of the agreement and is accompanied by a dialogue box with the button label 
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software program.  In other words, the user affirmatively demonstrated assent to the User 
Agreements by selecting “yes” or “ok” on the screen.  The 7th Circuit deemed the user to 
have had sufficient opportunity and notice in order to review the terms and to return the 
software if he did not wish to consent.  Consequently, the purchaser was contractually 
bound because of click-through consent to the terms which were conspicuously displayed 
on his screen.82 REGISTER.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc. presented a slightly more nuanced 
internet contracting inquiry.  A domain name registrar sued a service provider who 
repeatedly electronically requested data for marketing purposes from the website of the 
domain name registrar in violation of the registrar’s User Agreements.  After each such 
query, the service provider was presented with a notice that the act of querying 
constituted consent to the registrar’s User Agreements.  Because of the very large number 
of times the service provider was met with the explicit, conspicuous notice of being 
bound by the registrar’s User Agreements, and because of the service provider’s 
acknowledgment that it was aware of the existence of the User Agreements, the court 
ruled in favor of the plaintiff registrar. 83 Thus, repeated exposure to a conspicuous 
notice of User Agreements presented in a sentence was deemed to constitute affirmative 
consent to the terms.   
However, Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp. explained that if a website does 
not explicitly and clearly communicate that by clicking a download button or taking 
another action, a consumer is assenting to User Agreements, such User Agreements will 
not be upheld.  In Specht, the defendants moved to compel arbitration under the terms of 
 
"I agree" which the user must click prior to gaining access to the website content.  For a discussion of 
clickwrap and browsewrap agreements, see, e.g.,  Ryan J. Casamiquela, Contractual Assent and 
Enforceability in Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 475 (2002). 
82 86 F.Supp.2d 1165 (7th Cir. 1996).   
83 126 F. 2d at 400-401. 
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a linked license agreement which was presented through a small link at the bottom of the 
homepage to the User Agreements.84 The website at issue used a link that said “terms” 
and was presented below-the-fold in unremarkable type.85 The defendants in Specht 
argued that the plaintiffs should be held to a standard of “reasonable prudence” and that 
they should have known to scroll to the bottom of the webpage to look for license terms.  
The court rejected this argument, noting that license terms on a screen not readily visible 
are not enforceable when the defendant does not provide conspicuous notice of their 
existence to users. According to the Specht court, characteristics of unclear browsewrap 
links include use of small font, such as the font used for these footnotes, gray type on 
gray background, and unclear labeling of the link that intended to alert the user to the 
existence of an agreement behind the link.  Finally, the second iteration of Ticketmaster 
Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc.86 introduced a new generation of homepage User Agreement 
presentation.  The Ticketmaster website presented a link to its User Agreements at the top 
of the homepage of its website by embedding the link to the User Agreements in a 
sentence which stated that simply by browsing the website, the user was affirmatively 
consenting to be bound by the Ticketmaster User Agreements.87 Ticketmaster argued 
that Tickets.com, among other things, violated the Ticketmaster User Agreements by 
copying ticket and show information off the Ticketmaster website through the use of 
 
84 In Specht, internet users and a website operator brought a putative class action, alleging that a 
free software program invaded their privacy by transmitting information to the software provider without 
users’ consent 
85 150 F.Supp.2d 585 (S.D.N.Y.2001), aff’d 306 F.3d 17 (2nd Cir. 2002). 
86 2003 WL 21406289, 2003 Copr.L.Dec. P 28,607 (C.D.Cal., Mar 07, 2003)  The first iteration of 
a lawsuit between the same parties ended with Ticketmasters User Agreements not being upheld by the 
court deciding the matter. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2001 WL 51509 (9th Cir.(Cal.1998). 
87 This notice sentence browsewrap presentation from around the time of the institution of the 
second Ticketmaster litigation can be viewed at Internet Archive, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20030403073630/www.ticketmaster.com/ (last visited August 30, 2004). 
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spiders and bots88 on a continuous basis in violation of the Ticketmaster User 
Agreements.  Ticketmaster asserted Tickets.com was bound by the User Agreements 
because it had received notice of being bound by them through the browsewrap89 
embedded in a notice sentence on the Ticketmaster homepage.  Tickets.com sought 
summary judgment on all counts, and the court deciding the matter dismissed all counts 
by Ticketmaster against Tickets.com except for this allegation in contract.  The court 
deemed the contract issue worthy of surviving summary judgment; the obvious 
placement of the link to the User Agreements at the top of the Ticketmaster homepage 
and the link’s being embedded in an explicit notice sentence of contract formation “could 
not be missed.”90 
When taken together, these four cases can be said to create a sliding scale of User 
Agreements enforceability.  On the one hand, clickwrap agreements91 that prevent the 
user from accessing content without an explicit affirmative demonstration of consent will 
tend to be enforced by courts.92 On the other hand, courts tend to decline to enforce a 
browsewrap agreement93 with an ambiguous link located below the fold94 with no 
requirement of affirmative demonstration of consent by the user.95 In between these two 
 
88 Spiders and bots are small computer applications that run in the background and send data back 
to their originator on an ongoing basis.  For a more detailed description of spiders and bots, see, e.g., The 
Web Robots FAQ,  http://www.robotstxt.org/wc/faq.html (last visited August 31, 2004). 
89 See infra note 92 . 
90 2003 WL 21406289 at 2. 
91 See supra  note 80.  
92 See ProCD, 86 F.Supp.2d. 
93 A browsewrap is an agreement whose content is linked and no additional notice aside from the 
presence of the link is provided to the consumer regarding the existence of the agreement.  See, e.g., 
Casamiquela supra note 80.
94 Below the fold means the portion of the graphical user interface which is not readily visible to a 
user within the confines of the user’s monitor when the website loads. Consequently, above the fold is the 
readily visible portion. See, e.g., Marketingterms.com,  
http://www.marketingterms.com/dictionary/above_the_fold/ (last visited May 3, 2004). 
95 In Specht, the court deemed browsewrap User Agreements without a notice sentence and 
below-the-fold to be unenforceable. Specht, 150 F.Supp.2d, aff’d 306 F.3d. 
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extremes, are browsewrap agreements which might be called “notice sentence 
browsewraps.” 96 These notice sentence browsewraps intend to provide notice to a user of 
User Agreements through their placement and presentation of a link to the terms, usually 
in a full sentence above the fold on the homepage. In other words, the user is advised that 
taking a certain action constitutes consent to the terms of the linked agreement – the User 
Agreements presentation upheld by the Ticketmaster court.97 The more objectively 
conspicuous notice of terms is, the more likely a court is to determine a contract is 
procedurally fair and that digital consent exists.  
Using the current approach courts apply, commonality in understanding of the User 
Agreement between users and the content owner is not the critical inquiry, nor is the 
actual understanding of users.  Currently, the only critical inquiry courts undertake is 
whether the terms of the User Agreement are presented in a conspicuous manner.  If 
presentation is conspicuous in the subjective opinion of the court, the court deems 
consent to exist and enforces the terms as drafted and understood by the content owner. 
Thus, our current system can be depicted by Figure A below.   Each circle represents a 
party to a User Agreement and the links represent commonalities of understanding of 
User Agreements.   It is likely that many users will have common (mis)understandings of 
a User Agreement. However, the extent to which these user understandings overlap with 
each other and especially with the understanding of the drafter, a content owner, is 
 
96 In Verio, the court deemed the defendant to have notice of the browsewrap User Agreements in 
a notice sentence within a data entry dialog box. 126 F. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d as modified 356 F.3d 
393 (2nd Cir. 2004).  In Ticketmaster (2003), above-the-fold browsewrap User Agreements embedded in a 
notice sentence were deemed adequate to survive summary judgment challenge to contract claim. 
Ticketmaster, 2003 WL 21406289. 
97 At this writing, Ticketmaster has changed the placement of their User Agreements link on their 
homepage from the time of the Ticketmaster case.  However, the notice sentence browsewrap remains. See, 
e.g., Ticketmaster,  http://www.ticketmaster.com (last visited May 2, 2006) for an example of a notice 
browsewrap User Agreements presentation.  See, e.g., Yahoo!,  http://www.yahoo.com (last visited May 2, 
2006) for an example of a traditional browsewrap User Agreements presentation. 
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unknown.  This deficit in understanding the overlap or “meeting of the minds” is 
represented by a question mark in Figure A.
Figure A: Consent in our current system
3. Both Williston’s and Corbin’s definitions of unconscionability are 
met by many User Agreements 
 
Current caselaw’s sliding scale of procedural fairness in execution of digital contracts 
is, however, only half the picture.  The other half relates to substantive fairness and 
preventing unfair surprise.98 In the U.S., challenges99 could be brought to User 
 
98 I am rejecting Epstein’s argument that the only appropriate basis for findings of unconscionability 
include fraud, duress and undue influence.  We recognize “unfair trade practices” that fall short of fraud in 
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Agreements on the basis of either or both procedural unconscionability and substantive 
unconscionability.   To date, courts have focused solely on the procedural half of this 
duo, framing opinions using the language of consent.  This approach, however, comports 
with neither Williston’s nor Corbin’s approach to unconscionability and merits 
reassessment. 
Under traditional constructions of ensuring fairness and preventing unconscionability, 
these two types of fairness, procedural and substantive, are sometimes incorporated into a 
type of Willistonian sliding scale approach to unconscionability that combines both 
procedural and substantive factors in analysis.100 The method of execution and the 
complicated content in most User Agreements when taken together render most User 
Agreements wholly inaccessibility to an average user, eviscerating the existence of 
meaningful consent under Williston’s approach.   Similarly, Corbin’s test of 
unconscionability, which examines the terms in light of the general commercial 
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade is also met in the context of 
many User Agreements.101 Under Corbin’s approach, User Agreements are allegedly 
 
other legal contexts and this concept seems logical to include in contract law as well.   See Richard A. 
Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975). For additional views of 
unconscionability see, e.g. Richard L. Barnes, Rediscovering Subjectivity in Contracts:  Adhesion and 
Unconscionability, 66 LA. L. REV. 123 (2005); Philip Bridwell, The Philosophical Dimensions of the 
Doctrine of Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513 (2003);  Richard Craswell, Property Rules and 
Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1993);  Jeffrey L. 
Harrison, Class, Personality, Contract and Unconscionability, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 445 (1994);  
Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1203 (2003); Paul Bennet Marrow, Squeezing Subjectivity From the Doctrine of Unconscionability, 
53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 187 (2005); Horacio Specter, A Contractarian Approach to Unconscionability, 81 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 95 (2006). 
99 European Union grounds for invalidation of User Agreements content include violation of, among 
other directives, the European Union Directive on Distance Contracts and the Directive on Unfair Terms.  
See, e.g., James R. Maxeiner, Standard-terms Contracting in the Global Electronic Age:  European 
Alternatives, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 109 (2003). 
100 See, e.g., 15 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 1763A, at 213 
(3d ed. 1972) 
101See  Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 128 (1952). 
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authorizing conduct of ostensibly reputable companies, conduct that, in the opinion of 
other reputable companies in the same space, crosses the line into unwanted, even 
potentially illegal conduct as Section I described.  In the case study of invasive 
technologies such as security-invasive DRM, the combined weight of these two sets of 
factors bespeaks the urgency of reconstructing how and to what reasonable consumers 
meaningfully consent.  As previously discussed, companies using these invasive DRM 
methods frequently intentionally cloak their presence on user systems inhibiting full 
understanding of their workings by almost all users.  Meanwhile, other technology 
companies have labeled this type of DRM to be spyware rather than a legitimate 
intellectual property protection.  Thus, under either Williston’s or Corbin’s standard for 
unconscionability, meaningful user consent to User Agreements is unlikely to exist in 
many instances.  Consequently, relying on digital consent to User Agreements to 
authorize conduct otherwise tantamount to computer intrusion is a dubious legal 
approach.  Users can not always find or understand the User Agreements to which they 
have allegedly consented.  This difficulty arises both because of users’ lack of technology 
knowledge and because of the agreements themselves.102 
To resolve a portion of this doctrinal noise, courts should adopt a new approach for 
objectively assessing digital consent, an approach that would ensure User Agreements are 
 
102 Similarly the UCC’s approach to unconscionability would not save these User Agreements.   UCC 
2-302 requires a tribunal to focus on the commercial setting surrounding the transaction in question before 
making its determination as to unconscionability. Here, even assuming that UCC applies, a question that is 
not clear, the commercial standards are unclear and developing uniform law in this context would be 
hindered.   It might also be argued that perhaps courts are adopting Professor Epstein’s approach to 
unconscionability. Professor Epstein borrows the dichotomy between procedural and substantive 
unconscionability constructed by Professor Leff to argue that the only acceptable bases for 
unconscionability are solely procedural – defects in formation.  The substance of contractual provisions are 
not a primary concern under Epstein’s approach.  However some variants of DRM can be deemed to have 
even crossed Epstein’s line: they install themselves prior to providing a copy of the user agreement for 
review. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975). 
See also Arthur Allan Leff, Unconscionability and the Code--The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. 
REV. 485, 486-87 (1967). 
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likely to pass both Williston’s and Corbin’s tests for unconscionability.  The next section 
introduces one such possible approach – an objective reasonable digital consumer 
standard.  
 
Section 3 Organizational Code:  Reducing Noise through the “reasonable 
digital consumer”  
 
Crafting an ideal legal regime of digital consent means taking into account three 
fundamental ecological tensions in the technology contracting space:  (i) a macrosystem  
level tension between content entrepreneurship and consumer protection, (ii) a 
mesosystem level tension between legal content customization and legal standardization, 
and (iii) a microsystem level tension in simultaneously aiding development of both 
content owners and users, despite an information power imbalance in favor of the content 
owner. 
On the macrosystem or social level,103 a successful technology contracting 
architecture doctrinally constructs consent in a manner that both facilitates consumer 
protection concerns and allows for efficient business operations.  It is only when both 
these interests are served that a stable, trusted commercial technology environment will 
develop.  In other words, the need for innovation must be successfully balanced with the 
need for mass utilization104 and continuous evolution in the technology and intellectual 
 
103 This section adopts an ecological framework of analysis loosely based on the work of Urie 
Bronfenbrenner.  See URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (1979). 
Macrosystem level analysis requires examination at the level of culture as a whole, along with belief 
systems and ideologies underlying cultural rules and norms. In other words, the analysis focuses on the 
mechanisms of social governance and the worldview prevalent in civil society. Id. at 258.  
104 Adopting the language of architectural theorist Le Corbusier, the question of internet data 
security contracting asks us to balance the need for constant architectural innovation with the need for mass 
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property space.105 Practically speaking, this means creating a construction of consent that 
assists companies in mitigating business risk on the one hand, in exchange for ethical106 
treatment of users on the other.   
The mesosystem or interpersonal level107 of a successful architecture for 
technology contracting should foster development of relational commercial trust between 
the parties. Thus, machine-text convergence108 appears to be an inevitability; the ever-
increasing customization of digital content must be reconciled with legal predictability on 
a transaction-by- transaction basis. 109 In each transaction through a technology-mediated 
contract, users should have a meaningful opportunity to read and understand the terms of 
User Agreements that govern their relationships, should they wish to do so. 
Finally, on the microsystem or individual level of analysis, a successful digital 
contracting architecture would simultaneously foster development and economic self-
realization of both the content owner110 and user. In other words, development is a social 
 
utilization of the architecture.  Creativity must coincide with functionality for the people who exist within 
the space. See, e.g., LE CORBUSIER, TOWARDS A NEW ARCHITECTURE (1931). 
105 Turning to the lessons of cybernetics theory, Norbert Weiner’s work, as expanded by 
cybernetics theorist Gordon Pask, points us to the importance of constructing architectures with feedback 
loops.  Stagnancy in construction does not enable evolution of a space and results in obsolescence.  See, 
e.g. NORBERT WEINER, CYBERNETICS (1948); Gordon Pask, The Architectural Relevance of Cybernetics, 9
ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN 69 (1969). 
106 I use ethical here to refer to truthful disclosure and fulfillment of promised contractual 
obligations. 
107 The mesosytem or interpersonal level of analysis focuses attention on interpersonal dynamics 
and the dynamics between the individual and secondary settings, such as work  or business partners. 
Bronfenbrenner supra  note 100 supra, at 209. In other words, the level of each commercial exchange 
between a content owner and a user.  
108 When Radin discusses machine-text convergence she means that legal and technical 
standardization are closely related and that a paradigm shift is occurring in the manner in which we 
conceptualize contracting.  Radin. at 1138-1139. 
109 One option for reconciling this tension is creation standardization of process in lieu of 
standardization of content.  Standardized process can provide a stable basis for contractual interpretation, 
while customized content both enables the user to obtain value for her data and contract upon terms of her 
choice. 
110 Content owners are not necessarily large entities.  One of the primary cultural shifts 
precipitated by the internet is a rise in entrepreneurship because the transaction costs of internet business 
36
process, and it is critical to acknowledge the influence of the social environment and its 
tools on development.111 From the perspective of the companies that author User 
Agreements, a successful legal architecture of consent enables predictable outcomes for 
business development, expansion and greater economic self-realization without unduly 
burdensome legal commitments to users.  Meanwhile, from a user’s developmental 
perspective, a successful consent architecture scaffolds112 the user in technology 
contracting, protecting from possible harms from companies’ unethical conduct.  Perhaps 
most importantly, a successful technology contracting architecture may also assist users 
in evolving to view technology as a natural extension of their being.  Users may develop 
a type of commercial cyborg identity that will evolve away the perceived “specialness” of 
technology contracting.   
Elaborating on these concerns differently, the ideal architecture for digital consent 
would generate an exact overlap of understood meaning among users and a content 
owner.  This meaning would be memorialized in a User Agreement that articulated all 
material risks faced by both users and the content owner. All parties in this ideal universe 
would share an identical understanding of terms and no disagreements of meaning would 
arise.  In Figure B below, each circle represents a party to the User Agreement and each 
link represents a commonality in understanding of the User Agreement’s terms.  Using 
the language of network theory, one could argue that consent in an ideal system 
resembles a highly interconnected random network, a network where no node is likely to 
 
are significantly lower than those in real space.  Therefore, a content owner could be one individual 
entrepreneur who relies on an internet business as a primary source of income. 
111 The perspective adopted here is that of nonlinear contextualist human development theory. As 
such, it views development as a dialectical process with the environment that uses the “cultural tools” of 
the environment to facilitate development.  See, e.g., LEV VYGOTSKY, THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE (1962). 
112 The education theory concept of scaffolding refers to allowing a student to learn for herself 
while providing assistance to ensure her success.  See, e.g., KATHLEEN HOGAN AND MICHAEL PRESSLEY,
SCAFFOLDING STUDENT LEARNING: INSTRUCTIONAL APPROACHES AND ISSUES (1997) 
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be more connected than any other node.113 Enforcement of the understanding of the User 
Agreement held by any node in an ideal system is equally likely to reflect the 
understanding of every other node.  However, unfortunately, this ideal universe cannot 
exist because of differences in sophistication and power among various consumers and 
content providers.   
 
Figure B:  Consent in an ideal system
As described in the preceding sections, user consent, ostensibly demonstrated 
through User Agreements, is the lynchpin between the law of intellectual property and 
computer intrusion.  Similarly, as demonstrated by Figure A, the structure of our current 
 
113 In random networks, at the peak of the distribution, one assumes that a majority of nodes 
reflect the same number of links; nodes that have a significant difference in the number of links are an 
aberration.  See, e.g., BARABASI, infra   note 127, at 55-72. 
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consent architecture does not resemble the ideal structure of consent in Figure B. It is not 
the case that enforcement of any node’s understanding of a User Agreement is equally 
likely to reflect the understanding of any other node.  Therefore, the commonality of 
understanding may need to be legally generated.   This section proposes one possible 
legal approach to mitigate this doctrinal noise in a manner sensitive to the three sets of 
ecological concerns set forth above: this section advocates objectively defining digital 
consent through generating a standard contingent on empirically testing legal usability of 
agreements on real consumers.    
 
A. Constructing the “reasonable digital consumer” in the Context of Digital 
Contracting 
 
As previously described in Section 2, the law of digital contracting is currently 
relying solely on objective indicators of consent in determining whether digital contracts 
are binding on users.  Caselaw to date has examined issues relating to procedural fairness 
in generating an objective basis for believing consumer consent is present but as yet has 
not adequately explored issues of consent triggered by the substantive fairness of 
provisions.  Meanwhile, the most common defense that arises in cases involving 
controversial technology contracting situations such as those surrounding the User 
Agreements relating to invasive DRM is that the consumer consented to the DRM though 
the User Agreement.114 A court is then left to determine whether the User Agreement is 
enforceable and whether the consumer consented to the installation of the DRM.  
 
114 User Agreements frequently contain the following types of terms, some of which may 
ultimately be deemed unconscionable: an explicit assent by user to be bound by use at own risk; 
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Deciding whether consumer consent existed in a particular case can be 
accomplished through legally and empirically constructing a “reasonable digital 
consumer” standard.  Specifically, though borrowing legal methods of constructing 
“reasonable” consumers from trademark law115 and importing them into the law of digital 
contracts, a standard for objective consent can be crafted.  In this manner, objective 
consent becomes more readily determinable by courts and business entities alike, 
possibly triggering implied protections of neglected sections under the DMCA.   This 
method of constructing objective consent also leverages the dynamic emergent processes 
already visible in the law and in digital contracting practices today. 
A consent regime predicated on an empirically constructed reasonable consumer 
would be built as follows.  When a company drafts a new User Agreement, it would 
 
incorporation of other product specific agreements by reference; an intellectual property rights retainer for 
the website owner or services provider; a limited intellectual property license to use for the user;  an 
assignment of rights by the user in communications with the website; a disclaimer of any representations 
and warranties in connection with the website or services; a disclaimer of responsibility for third party 
content; a limitation of liability; a user indemnification for damages arising out of the user’s use of the site 
or poor security behaviors such as password management; a prohibition on linking; a conduct code for the 
website; a securities disclaimer relating to forward looking statements and updating of content; a securities 
disclaimer stating no offer of securities is made through the site; user representations and warranties related 
to security of passwords; user warranties related to providing of notice about problem with password or 
leakage of data; a termination provision with no notice by the content owner; a choice of law provision; a 
choice of venue and consent to jurisdiction provision; a severability provision; a provision stipulating 
unilateral amendment of terms by the content owner;  a provision stipulating unilateral amendment of site 
content on no notice; an integration clause; a provision providing for selective enforcement of remedies 
under the agreement by the content owner; and a prohibition on user assignment of rights and obligations 
under the User Agreements. 
115 For discussion of trademark harms and the manner in which they are adjudicated by courts, 
see, e.g., Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of “Trademark Use”, 39 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 371 (2006); Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment “With Goodwill”:  A Concept Whose Time Has 
Gone, 57 FLA. L. REV. 771 (2005); David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine:  Toward a Coherent 
Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in American Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 117 (2004); Jane 
C. Ginsburg, The Author’s Name as a Trademark:  A Perverse Perspective on the Moral Right of 
“Paternity”?,  23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 379 (2005);  Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in 
Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507 (2005); Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym:  
Authorship, Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377 (2005); Daniel Klerman, 
Trademark Dilution, Search Costs, and Naked Licensing, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1759 (2006);   Mark A. 
Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (2006); 
Gideon Parchomovsky, On Trademarks, Domain Names, and Internal Auctions, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 211 
(2001); Jennifer Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 105 (2005). 
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conduct a “legal usability test” 116 to ensure predictable outcomes in enforcement of the 
User Agreement.   Many companies will not necessarily perceive this as unduly 
burdensome because they already run usability tests on their products on a regular 
basis.117 For example, a company selling dancing pig screensaver downloads would 
likely conduct empirical tests with users to determine whether the user can successfully 
navigate the user interface and download the new dancing purple pig screensaver.  
During this product usability test, the company would add in a series of questions and 
exercises to test whether the users can also successfully navigate the user interface to read 
and understand the User Agreement.   In this way, companies would begin to view the 
User Agreement as an integral part of the product and worry about its functionality to the 
same extent they worry about functionality of the product itself.   These usability tests, if 
conducted thoroughly, will demonstrate which provisions and User Agreements 
consumers regularly fail to understand.  Particular incentive exists to ensure that users 
understand provisions that allow a content provider to engage in behaviors that are 
otherwise prohibited by law.    If this usability tested User Agreement is subsequently 
challenged in court, a finder of fact only needs to examine the validity of the usability test 
and its results, rather than constructing a theoretical “reasonable consumer” from the 
 
116 When I speak of legal usability I do not merely mean an expert counting numbers of syllables 
or words.  I refer to a statistically significant sample of consumers interacting with an actual contract and 
attempting to derive meaning from it.  For a discussion of early “usability” tests of counting syllables, such 
as the Flesch test see, e.g., E.B. WHITE, THE SECOND TREE FROM THE CORNER, 166 (1954).  
117 Usability testing of user interfaces is an almost universal practice in the software industry.  The 
major critiques of usability testing include the assertions that  results are inaccurate because users are paid 
for participation, know they are being studied, and are generally using a machines that are not their own in 
the study.  For a discussion of usability testing, see, e.g., CAROL M. BARNUM, USABILITY TESTING AND 
RESEARCH (2001); JOSEPH S. DUMAS, JANICE C. REDISH, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO USABILITY TESTING 
(1999); JAKOB NIELSEN, USABILITY ENGINEERING (1994); JEFFREY RUBIN, HANDBOOK OF USABILITY 
TESTING: HOW TO PLAN, DESIGN, AND CONDUCT EFFECTIVE TESTS (1994). 
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mind of the judge.  If no usability test was done preemptively, at the time of the litigation, 
the court would order a test be performed by a court appointed expert.  
This construction of a reasonable consumer to determine liability is not entirely 
novel.  Trademark law has long used empirical consumer testing in litigation to ascertain 
whether likelihood of consumer confusion exists.  In a trademark case, if a plaintiff 
alleges that consumers were confused by the similarity between the plaintiff’s mark and 
the defendant’s mark, the plaintiff has a burden of providing evidence of a likelihood of 
confusion.  The manner in which plaintiffs frequently demonstrate this likelihood is 
through presenting empirical survey evidence that consumers were actually confused by 
the relationship between two marks.118 A showing of actual confusion through empirical 
survey evidence is deemed strong evidence toward finding infringement.119 Conversely, 
a demonstration by a defendant that empirical survey evidence shows consumers were 
not confused by the relationship of two marks is a strong refutation of a plaintiff’s 
allegation of confusion and infringement.   This model can be adapted to the digital 
contracting context.  
Specifically, in the context of security-invasive DRM, empirical evidence can be 
obtained to demonstrate whether a reasonable consumer was confused or is likely to have 
consented to the installation of the DRM in question.  Provided that this empirical 
evidence is collected and analyzed in accordance with generally accepted social science 
 
118 For example, in a famous cancellation petition before the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board regarding the servicemark “Realtor”, a battle of empirical 
studies occurred with the board assessing the validity and strength of each.  See Jacob Zimmerman v. 
National Association of Realtors, Nov. 8, 2003  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/foia/ttab/other/2004/92032360.pdf
119 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that a survey demonstrating actual 
consumer confusion may be sufficient to prove a likelihood of confusion as a matter of law. Likelihood of 
confusion is a key element of proving infringement.  See Thane International, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18344 (9th Cir. Sept. 6, 2002).  
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research methods, results can reveal the likelihood that a reasonable consumer was able 
to find and understand the User Agreement allegedly authorizing the DRM installation.   
Concretely, during the study a sample group120 of consumers would be asked a series of 
questions probing their understanding of the User Agreement at issue.  The questions 
would examine the following subjects.  Was the user presented with the User Agreement 
before the security-invasive DRM installed itself?  At the time the user first used the 
product accompanied by security-invasive DRM, was the user aware that s/he had 
entered into a contract involving the DRM?  Was the user expressly advised that security-
invasive DRM may potentially jeopardize the security of the user’s system and did the 
user understand what this meant?  Was the extent of the risk explained?  Was the DRM 
particular behavior being litigated explicitly authorized or understood by a reasonable 
consumer through the User Agreement?  For example, do users understand that terms 
such as “a small proprietary software program”121 used in a User Agreement, unless 
clearly defined,122 can be referring to rootkits and other malware, types of code generally 
used by hackers that harm security?  If the answer to these types of questions is yes, then 
 
120 In empirical research, the larger the sample and the more carefully the sample is constructed, the 
more generalizable the results from a study.  Samples with fewer than 30 subjects are usually deemed 
flawed.  For a discussion of proper sampling methodology see, e.g. WILLIAM G. COCHRAN, SAMPLING 
TECHNIQUES (1977); PAUL S. LEVY, STANLEY LEMESHOW, SAMPLING OF POPULATIONS : METHODS AND 
APPLICATIONS (1999). 
121 This language was used in Sony’s User Agreement to describe the rootkit installed by Sony CD’s 
on user machines that created a security hole on user machines and allowed hackers to take control of these 
machines.  See infra note 120.  
122 For a defense of textualist contract analysis, see Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory 
and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 568 n. 50 (2003) (proposing textualism for 
interpretation of contract between commercial parties) But see Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, 
Party Autonomy, and Good Faith, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1223, 1224 (1999) ("[M]odern celebration of 
the authority of text threatens to consign the doctrine of good faith to an inconsequential marginal note in 
the law of contracts… every expressly conferred contractual power is presumptively absolute and 
unrestricted."); Steven J. Burton, Default Principles, Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 115, 138-39 (1993) ( " Even if efficiency justified enforcing deals the parties made, the 
justification for enforcing a deal made by the parties is not a justification for enforcing a deal they did not 
make."). 
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consent is deemed to exist and the User Agreement is deemed enforceable.  If, however, 
one or more of these key elements does not exist, the contract is deemed unenforceable 
on the basis of an absence of meaningful consent.123 
User Agreements are drafted solely for the purpose of obtaining additional 
benefits for intellectual property holders over and above what they already possess in 
intellectual property law.  A finding of inadequate consent to a User Agreement would 
mean that the intellectual property owner is not entitled to these additional benefits 
carved out in the User Agreement, but the owner still retains all those rights explicitly 
provided under intellectual property law.  As such, in the event of a User Agreement 
being deemed unenforceable, content owners will not be stripped of all intellectual 
property protections.   The only benefits content owners would not be awarded are those 
additional benefits they sought for themselves through contracts that were not theirs 
already by virtue of law.  On the consumer side, a finding that a User Agreement is 
unenforceable due to lack of consent opens the door to possible civil or criminal litigation 
against the intellectual property holder.  Without consent, as was previously discussed, 
 
123 Using the language of one of the Sony-BMG User Agreements involved in litigation, a usability 
test would question whether a reasonable user understands that the following language authorized 
installation of a rootkit that could be exploited by third parties to remotely control the user’s machine and 
collect data from the user’s harddrive:  “As soon as you have agreed to be bound by the terms and 
conditions of the EULA, this CD will automatically install a small proprietary software program (the 
“SOFTWARE”) onto your computer.  The software is intended to protect the audio files embodied on the 
CD, and it may also facilitate your use of the digital content.  Once installed, the software will reside on 
your computer until removed or deleted.  However, the software will not be used at any time to collect any 
personal information from you, whether stored on your computer or otherwise.”   Further, the language in 
the limitation of liability in this EULA limits consumers recovery for any bad acts of Sony’s “small 
proprietary software” to $5 in some states:  “…IN ANY CASE, THE ENTIRE LIABILITY OF THE 
SONY BMG PARTIES, COLLECTIVELY, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THIS EULA SHALL BE 
LIMITED TO FIVE US DOLLARS (US $5.00)…”   See Sony User Agreement,  
http://www.sysinternals.com/blog/sony-eula.htm (last visited March 2, 2006). 
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security-invasive DRM can be legally reclassified as an actionable computer intrusion for 
installation of code on a third party machine.124 
B. Reducing “Noise” in the System:  the Legal and Practical Benefits of 
Legal Usability Testing and the Reasonable Digital Consumer Standard 
 
Introducing legal usability testing and the “reasonable digital consumer” standard in 
to contract law provides five principle legal and practical benefits to ease the current legal 
noise in our system.  First, such an approach offers minimum disruption to the trend in 
 
124 A practical difficulty in suits civil and criminal suits resulting from unenforceable User Agreements 
under current computer intrusion law would be assessment of damages.  ECPA and CFAA have been 
plagued by difficulty of quantifying damages for computer intrusions.  For example, in the context of 
intentional violations, under the CFAA no statutory damages are available and courts vary in the ways they 
assess damages. Under the Act’s §1030(g), a private right of action is available for any victim who suffers 
"damage or loss" due to a violation of the Act. Damage is defined under §1030(e)(8) of the statute and 
requires either (A) losses aggregating $5,000 during any 1-year period to one or more individuals; (B) 
impairment to medical diagnosis or treatment; (C) physical injury to any person; or (D) a threat to public 
health or safety. Many plaintiffs have encountered problems meeting the $5,000 threshold for damages. 
Two schools of thought exist regarding the proper interpretation of the CFAA damage requirements in 
§1030(g) creating a private right of action for anyone suffering "damage or loss." While "damage" is 
defined and requires plaintiffs to meet a threshold of $5,000, the term "loss" is not defined.  Courts have 
also differed as to whether damages to multiple plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit can be aggregated in 
order to meet the $5,000 threshold and the extent to which loss of goodwill can be included in calculations.  
But under the ECPA, minimum statutory damages of $10,000 are available for violations of Title I124 and 
$1000 for violations of Title II, in part because of the difficulty of quantifying damages for security 
breaches.   See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §2520.  However, a debate exists in the courts whether courts have the 
discretion not to award any damages in some cases. See, e.g., Nally v. Nally, 53 F.3d 649 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(courts have discretion not to award  damages); Culbertson v. Culbertson, 143 F.3d 825 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(courts have discretion); Reynolds v. Spears, 93 F.3d 428 (8th Cir. 1996); but see Rogers v. Wood, 910 
F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1990), reh. den. 914 F.2d 26 (courts must award a minimum of $10,000 in statutory 
damages per violation); Menda Biton v. Menda, 812 F. Supp. 283 (D.P.R., 1993) (courts must award 
damages); Desilets v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 171 F.3d 711, 713 (1st Cir. 1999) (suggesting in dicta courts 
must award damages). However, in this case of security-invasive DRM, perhaps we can seek guidance 
from the Copyright Act itself.  If Congress were to pass a statutory corollary allowing the minimum 
copyright statutory damages to apply each instance of invasive DRM activity, for example, the issue would 
be resolved.   Congress articulated a statutory minimum in the Copyright Act precisely because of the 
difficulty in determining damages in instances of violations of rights in intangible assets.  The same logic 
applies to damages calculations in computer intrusions resulting from security-invasive DRM.  Using the 
statutory damages amounts specified by the Copyright Act as a basis for DRM intrusions damages, the 
issue of damage can be resolved.  
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prior digital contract caselaw toward objective rather than subjective determinations of 
consent.  Simultaneously, it pushes caselaw toward the contractual ideal of the meeting of 
the minds.   Second, it acknowledges that consumers’ understanding of contract terms is 
an emergent construct; it changes in response to external social influences over time. 
Third, constructing an objective consent standard through empirical legal usability testing 
of contracts improves businesses’ ability to engage in effective legal risk management 
planning.   To increase likelihood of enforceability of their agreements, businesses can 
choose to usability test them in advance of litigation to mitigate legal risk and re-test 
them when terms are changed. Fourth, this approach neither patronizes consumers as 
incapable of consent nor does it leave them without recourse for draconian 
unconscionable contracts or for code that harms the security of their systems.  Fifth, an 
objective construction of consumer consent controls for the drastically varying levels of 
technological savviness among judges.  Finally, this regime leverages the naturally 
occurring structures of organization in both the construction of legal consent and the way 
that legal forms are transmitted among the lawyers who draft User Agreements. 
 
1. Consonance with the trends of prior digital contracting caselaw 
and moving toward the contractual ideal  
 
To date, digital contracting caselaw has indicated a clear preference for objective 
constructions of consent over subjective constructions of consent.  This preference arises 
in part because of the difficulty that determining subjective consent in digital context 
would present.  An objective standard better strikes a balance between customization and 
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standardization than a standard subjective to each transaction could offer.   Similarly, 
language of “reasonable” consumer behaviors is doctrinally pervasive in both contract 
law and intellectual property law.  Generating a reasonable digital consumer standard of 
consent continues these trends, resolving doctrinal tensions with minimal disruption to 
the preexisting system.  
Theoretically, adopting a reasonable digital consumer standard eliminates the 
deficit of a meeting of the minds set forth in Figure A. It also more closely approximates 
Figure B, the ideal structure of consent, than does our current regime.   As illustrated in 
Figure C below, a reasonable digital consumer standard merges the subjective contractual 
interpretations of all parties to the User Agreement, i.e. both content owner and users, 
into one common objective understanding.  It is as if a new person has been added to the 
contractual relationship, a person that always shares some understandings of both parties.   
The circles in Figure C represent these parties to the User Agreement and links between 
them indicate a common understanding of a User Agreement term.  In Figure A, our
current legal regime, we cannot ascertain whether a link of common understanding exists 
between the content provider’s and users’ understanding of the User Agreement. In 
Figure C, we are certain this link exists through the reasonable digital consumer standard.  
Unlike in Figure A where the content provider’s subjective understanding of terms is 
enforced absent procedural unfairness, Figure C shifts the doctrinal balance from purely 
procedural concerns to both procedural and substantive concerns.  Concern over both 
procedure and substance has been the hallmark of traditional unconscionability doctrine.  
A reasonable digital consumer standard checks the power imbalance between the content 
owners who draft User Agreements and the users who are bound by them:  User 
47
Agreements can assert additional legal rights for content owners only to the extent that 
reasonable users understand these additional legal rights have been asserted.    A 
reasonable digital consumer legally generates a fictional “hub” of common understanding 
of the parties. 
 
Figure C:  Consent with the reasonable digital consumer Standard
2. Allowing for evolution in consumer understanding of digital 
consent 
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The average levels of technology skills change over time within individuals and 
across cohorts.  As different cohorts of users reach contractual capacity, the level of 
technology skills held by a reasonable digital consumer will also evolve.  Adopting a 
contractual standard of consent that is predicated on empirical testing of real consumers 
of a particular point in time ensures that contractual notions of reasonable consumer 
behavior are closely aligned with the social realities of consumer technology proficiency 
levels.125 
3. Facilitating greater predictability in legal outcomes to assist in 
enterprise risk management planning 
 
The most effective method of mitigating corporate legal risks is a pro-active 
approach - creating a process of regular legal strategic planning.    Its goal is to accurately 
assess legal risks associated with corporate information assets and generate legal 
feedback loops to mitigate these risks in both the present and future.  Therefore, it is 
likely that many large companies would be willing to usability test their legal documents 
in advance of litigation; the business certainty these tests would provide facilitates more 
effective enterprise risk management.    
A usability testing option for technology mediated contracts translates legal 
uncertainty in essence into a business risk calculus that companies will be able to 
understand more clearly than the current legal landscape.  To increase likelihood of 
enforceability of their agreements, businesses can choose to usability test them in 
 
125 This evolution will mean a need to update and usability test legal agreements on a regular basis.   
As terms and consumer understanding changes, the reasonable digital consumer may understand a 
particular agreement differently. 
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advance of litigation to mitigate legal risk and re-test them when terms are changed.  
Conversely, if a business wishes to accept the legal risk of going into litigation with a 
non-usability tested User Agreement, they are accepting a certain quantifiable risk  – the 
risk of all protections in the agreement apart from the intellectual property rights they 
hold by law.  They also will have time-shifted the costs associated with usability testing 
the contract to the time of the litigation.   
 
4. Protecting consumers from security risks without infantilizing 
them 
 
Because of the severity of widespread data vulnerability in the United States, 
teaching users and technologists to protect themselves through legal means is 
increasingly critical.   Currently, many users, even sophisticated users, click “yes” to 
every box that appears on their screen and download potentially harmful code without 
reading the accompanying legal agreements or understanding the technological and legal 
ramifications of their actions.  Simultaneous legal and technological user education is 
necessary to mitigating the epidemics of phishing, malspam,126 zombie drones, and 
identity theft generally.  Law and technology must evolve together and push users to help 
solve their own security problems.  In this way, users’ trust in technology, particularly in 
the internet as a commercial medium will not be further diminished despite the prevalent 
serious security concerns that accompany its use.   
 
126 Malspam is spam that exploits security vulnerabilities on a user’s PC.  See Andrea M.  
Matwyshyn, Penetrating the Zombie Collective:  Spam As an International Security Issue, __ SCRIPT-ED __ 
(2006) (forthcoming).    
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Many technologists would turn every PC into a user-proof black box and remove 
users from the security equation as much as possible.  Our current legal regime of 
technology mediated contracts, in essence, does the legal equivalent:  reasonable users 
are unlikely to be capable of understanding most User Agreements at present, assuming 
the users even notice that the agreements exist and govern their conduct.  Even if users 
struggled through a User Agreement allowing security-invasive DRM as currently 
drafted, users’ ability to understand possible consequences of their consent is limited by 
their own technology knowledge and experience.   At this point in the technological 
development of our society, users need help in defending themselves from overly 
aggressive code.127 If average users can understand neither code nor the User 
Agreements associated with code, their ability to make informed decisions is severely 
impaired. 
 
5. Correcting for varying levels of judges’ technology knowledge 
 
This empirically constructed reasonable consumer standard in essence leverages 
tools already used by courts and intellectual property owners.  Adopting an empirically 
generated reasonable digital consumer standard would simplify the lives of judges and 
smooth out the practical effects of variations of technology knowledge from judge to 
judge. 128 The reasonable digital consumer standard eliminates the need for a judge to 
 
127 For example, the Sony User Agreement includes a provision which is likely to be the provision 
Sony would allege authorizes the installation of the rootkit, which describes the rootkit as “a small 
proprietary  software program.”  See supra note 120. It if unlikely a user, even if a user knew what a 
rootkit was, would interpret this provision to allow for installation of a rootkit and its attendant security 
risks. 
128 These variations in knowledge are discussed in the contract literature as influencing outcomes, 
particularly in the absence of clear instructions from the parties in the contract regarding how they wish the 
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walk through the particular website or application at issue and, instead, only requires a 
judge to determine the credibility of the usability studies entered into evidence.  A 
complicated question of digital consent is thereby transformed into a typical “battle of 
experts” scenario, which courts face in numerous other legal non-technological contexts.
 Similarly, trademark caselaw has well-established methods for determining 
whether a “reasonable” consumer is confused by a particular trademark or practice; these 
cases employ empirical testing by experts using real consumers.    Little new 
methodology would need to be generated by courts to incorporate a consent construction 
based on a reasonable digital consumer.  
 
6. Leveraging the natural structure of the system -- the scale-free nature 
of objective consent and form transmission patterns of lawyers 
 
Our social system is a complex system.  Complex systems are characterized by a 
large number of similar but independent actors who persistently move, respond and 
evolve in relation to each other in an increasingly sophisticated manner.129 The result of 
 
dispute resolved.  See Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial 
Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 754 (2000) (assuming that "parties lack the clairvoyance needed to give 
courts the proper guidance if a dispute arises, and courts lack the genius that would be needed to enforce 
contracts properly in the absence of such guidance"). 
129 For various applications of complex systems theory to other legal contexts see, e.g. David G. 
Post and David R. Johnson, “Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent”: Toward a New Theory of 
Decentralized Decision-making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1055 (1998) (arguing that legal 
theory would be enriched by paying attention to algorithms derived from the study of complex systems in 
contexts such as competitive federalism and the “patching” algorithm). See also, e.g., Susan P. Crawford, 
The Biology of the Broadcast Flag, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.L. J. 603 (2003); Susan W. Brenner, 
Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace: Distributed Security, 10 B.U.J.SCI & TECH. L. 1 (2004); Robert 
A. Creo, Mediation 2004: The Art and the Artist, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 1017 (2004); Jim Chen, Webs of 
Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of Information Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 495 (2004); Scott H. 
Hughes, Understanding Conflict in a Postmodern World, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 681 (2004); Daniel A. Farber, 
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this evolution is a form of self-organization in which order in the system forms 
spontaneously, and local rules govern the conduct of each actor.  Numerous independent 
actors, acting in clustered groups130 frequently follow local rules131 and demonstrate 
increasingly complicated visible patterns of natural organization of behaviors and 
norms.132 Legal behaviors can follow this pattern.133 
One type of network structure that exists in complex systems is a scale free 
network structure.134 Scale-free networks consist of different points or “nodes” in the 
network which evidence drastically different levels of connectivity–some nodes are 
connected to a very large number of other nodes and some nodes are connected to only a 
 
Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 
145 (2003); Erica Beecher-Monas, Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting Violent 
Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV.1848 (2003); J.B. Ruhl, James Salzman, Mozart 
and the Queen:  The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757 (2003); 
Daniel S. Goldberg, And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: How Classical Scientific Fallacies Undermine 
the Validity of Textualism and Originalism, 39 HOUS. L.REV. 463 (2002); Thomas R. McClean, Application 
of Administrative Law to Health Care Reform: The Real Politik of Crossing the Quality Chasm, 16 
J.L.&HEALTH 65 (2001-2002); James Salzman, J.B. Ruhl, Kai-Sheng Song, Regulatory Traffic Jams, 2 
WYO. L. REV. 253 (2002); Jeffrey G. Miller, Evolutionary Statutory Interpretation: Mr. Justice Scalia 
Meets Darwin, 20 PACE L.REV. 409 (2000); Patricia A. Martin, Bioethics and the Whole Pluralism, 
Consensus, and the Transmutation of Bioethical Methods into Gold, 27 J.L.Med. & Ethics 316 (1999); J.B. 
Ruhl, The Coevolution of Sustainable Development and Environmental Justice: Cooperation, Then 
Competition, Then Conflict, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L.& POL’Y F. 161 (1999); Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, 
Complexity, and Coevolution: The Web of Law, Management Theory, and Law Related Services at the 
Millennium, 66 TENN. L.REV.137 (1998); Jeff L. Lewin, The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Uncertainty 
and “Reasonable Medical Certainty”, 57 Md.L.Rev. 380 (1998);  J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using 
Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and its Practical Meaning for 
Democracy, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1407 (1996); Gerald Andrews Emison, The Potential for Unconventional 
Progress: Complex Adaptive Systems and Environmental Quality Policy, 7 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 167 
(1996). 
130 ALBERTO LASZLO BARABASI, LINKED (2002) 
131 For example, outside of User Agreements, online communities often have additional 
community rules of conduct. See, e.g., AOL Community Rules,  http://www.aol.com/community/rules.html
(last visited May 3, 2004). 
132 For example, the Milgram “six degrees of separation” study was replicated using email to 
demonstrate the hubbed nature of the Web.  See Email Updates Six Degrees,  
http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/rnb_081803.asp (last visited May 3, 2004). 
133 The behavior of complex adaptive systems frequently cannot be accurately predicted and can 
naturally evolve to a state of self-organization on the border between order and disorder. GARNETT P. 
WILLIAMS, CHAOS THEORY TAMED , 234 ( 1997), 
134 BARABASI, supra  note 129, at 55-72. By contrast, in random networks, at the peak of the 
distribution, one assumes that a majority of nodes reflect the same number of links and nodes with a 
significant difference in the number of links are an aberration. 
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few others.135 In a scale-free network, no typical node exists and the network is composed 
of a continuous hierarchy of nodes with a few “hubs”136 and numerous small nodes.137 
I postulate that both the naturally occurring structure of a legal regime of 
objective consent – either the one that we currently have or one driven by the proposed 
reasonable digital consumer standard – in essence generates a scale-free network 
distribution of first, meaning of consent and second, the spread of legal “forms” through 
our economy due to document sharing behaviors of transactional lawyers.   
 
a. A reasonable digital consumer standard generates an objective 
“hub” of shared understanding for both contract procedure and 
substance 
 
An objective construction of consent aims to find external evidence that courts 
and businesses can rely on across contractual instances.  Therefore, the broader goal of an 
objectively based regime of consent is to generate “hubs” of shared understanding of 
what behaviors equate to contractual consent.   The reasonable digital consumer is a legal 
generation of hub of shared understanding that eliminated the power imbalance between 
content providers and consumers.  Currently, the hubs of allegedly shared understanding 
have been constructed by courts, on the one hand, using self-referential bases, i.e. 
 
135 Id.  
136 Hubs are nodes with an unusually, disproportionately large number of nodes connected to 
them.  Id.  For example, Google is, as of this writing, a hub.  See Google,  http://www.google.com (last 
visited May 2, 2006). 
137 Erdos and Renyi’s random network theory, as extended by Watts and Strogatz asserted that the 
number of nodes with a particular number of links decreases on an exponential basis, which is a rate of 
decay that is swifter than the rate predicted by a power law.  BARABASI, supra  note 129, at 56. 
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whatever the judge thinks, and on the other hand, by enforcing the understandings of 
companies drafting the User Agreements.   
These dynamics have resulted in what is known as a “rich get richer” 
phenomenon138 – as it has been empirically demonstrated,139 User Agreements have 
become progressively more draconian in their terms over time because their authors 
generated their content, crafting the hubs of understanding through use of form 
agreements. This behavior evidences a self-reinforcing mechanism of preferential 
attachment140 driven by using the most draconian forms available, meaning that drafters 
tend to gravitate toward the most restrictive language.  Meanwhile, the content of User 
Agreements has frequently been enforced by courts. Courts have been focusing their 
attention solely on generating procedural hubs of shared digital behavior to determine if 
contractual consent has occurred and ignored concerns over content.  These two concerns 
should be taken together to generate a legal hub of common understanding.     
Courts have rarely seen a workable alternative option to rampant use of 
unilaterally-generated form agreements in digital contracting contexts.  Generating a 
reasonable digital consumer standard for consent may offer just such an alternative.  This 
new standard creates hubs of understanding, with the critical difference being that the 
hubs are centered around genuine understandings, both procedural and substantive, of 
living consumers.  A reasonable digital consumer standard does not use a hypothetical 
 
138 See, e.g., Koen Franken, Technological Innovation and Complexity Theory  
http://econ.geog.uu.nl/frenken/frenkeninnovationcomplexity.pdf (last visited March 9, 2006).  
139 See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Mutually Assured Protection: Development of Relational Internet 
and Privacy Contracting Norms in MARGARET RADIN ET AL, (EDS.), SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET 
AGE (2006)(forthcoming, on file with author). 
140 For a discussion of preferential attachment see BARABASI, supra note 129, 86-69. 
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consumer postulated by a particular court, nor does it give undue deference to the one-
sided User Agreement forms many companies will continue to use if left unchecked.   
 
b. A reasonable digital consumer standard leverages lawyers’ 
“form sharing” behaviors and would quickly spread 
 
Pragmatically, a reasonable digital consumer standard, as embodied by the 
usability tested forms that reflect it, would slowly permeate the system because of 
another scale-free network – the scale-free network of form sharing among transactional 
lawyers.  In perhaps an ironic twist, transactional attorneys “borrow” forms from each 
other and use each others’ cumulative experience.  Particularly in the context of User 
Agreements that are available online, a transactional attorney will frequently review other 
attorneys’ work as a point of reference before drafting her/his own User Agreements.  
Consequently, what develops over time is a network structure with “hubs” of agreements 
and provisions that look essentially alike.  Norms of language and document structure 
develop that are then reinforced by further sharing and court enforcement.  Transactional 
attorneys seek to use norms to their advantage rather than to go against them when 
drafting.  Consequently, if even only a few influential companies that use digital 
contracts shift to agreements that reflect usability tested standards, they will be able to 
instigate the emergence of a new norm in the system over time through lawyers’ drafting 
behaviors.  The other “node” companies will follow the lead of the influential “hub” 
companies. 
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In this way, the reasonable digital consumer standard leverages the naturally 
occurring structures of our social system but gently nudges them toward more optimal 
emergence; it helps guide development of these structures of regulation in a manner that 
reconciles the noise currently surrounding the construct of digital consent in our system.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In its preceding pages, this article has set forth doctrinal tensions that exist in the 
meaning of “consent” in technology contracting.  It has argued that the policy and legal 
challenges causing systemic noise in meanings of consent among three bodies of law 
require reconciliation through a new contracting construct for objective consent.  The 
arrival of security-invasive DRM provides illustration for the necessity of clarifying the 
meaning of consent in digital contracting caselaw. 
One possible avenue for building this new consent construct may be the 
generation of a “reasonable digital consumer”.    A “reasonable digital consumer” 
standard can be generated through external empirical means modeled on the manner in 
which consumer confusion is determined in trademark caselaw.  This proposal leverages 
the naturally occurring structures in our complex social system to minimize the noise that 
currently surrounds doctrinal construction of consent.  
